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Experience and FDI Risk-taking: A Microfoundational Reconceptualization 
 
Abstract 
 Studies of how firms respond to host country risk have assigned explanatory primacy to 
organizational capability and managerial risk preference. The organization-level account is built on 
the premise that capability is a prerequisite for risk-taking while the individual-level account focuses 
on the managers’ intrinsic behavioral attitude. Without integrating one with the other, the former is 
open to many alternative explanations while the latter remains only a source of heterogeneity. We 
propose that employing the microfoundations approach can address the limitations of each account 
and yield a fuller understanding of FDI risk-taking. Drawing upon behavioral decision theory and the 
concept of risk propensity, we describe the lower-level mechanisms that generate the empirical 
regularity between firm experience and risk-taking, which has been attributed to the macro-level 
capabilities paradigm. We finalize the framework with an account as to how individual-level 
mechanisms can be incorporated into the context of organizational strategic decision-making. 
 
Keywords: country risk, risk propensity, microfoundations, behavioral decision-making, experience  
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1 Introduction 
Managing risk is one of the most important strategic objectives for managers of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) (Ghoshal, 1987). Given the pervasiveness of risk and the significant resource 
commitments of cross-border venturing (Cosset and Roy, 1991), an extensive literature has been 
devoted to understanding the impact of risk and uncertainty on foreign direct investment (FDI) 
decisions (e.g., Delios and Henisz, 2003a; Delios and Henisz, 2003b). Globalization has given rise to 
new forms of risks, including cyber-attack, industrial espionage, governmental surveillance and 
public-private tension, among others. It is imperative for international business (IB) scholars to revisit 
the state of current knowledge and examine whether extant theoretical and empirical approaches can 
address the questions posed by the ever increasingly complex world. 
 
The past two decades has seen a steady and remarkable growth of FDI into developing 
countries (Feinberg and Gupta, 2009). There is an incomplete explanation as to why MNEs engage 
rather than avoid weak institutions and policy hazards commonly found in these markets. The 
dominant explanation is predicated on an observed relationship between a firm’s international 
experience and risk-taking, attributing this relationship to firm-level capabilities (Delios and Henisz, 
2003b). This explanation further extends to home country experience, which is hypothesized to be one 
of the major sources of international competitive advantage for emerging multinationals (EMNEs) 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Del Sol and Kogan, 2007; Luo and Wang, 2012). While it is true that 
repeated exposure to the same risk may help managers develop coping mechanisms to contain the 
effect of adversity and to recover from it so that they believe they can condition the odds suggested by 
external information (Oetzel and Oh, 2014), the firm-level capabilities are only inferred and often 
assumed to be an automatic result of experience. We question whether the organizational capability is 
real or a misconception of the decision makers, especially when generalizing experience from one 
context to another is often required for FDI decision-making, which involves the transfer of 
knowledge across the borders. This is not an unreasonable question given that cognition research 
suggests that individuals work within a framework constrained by numerous cognitive biases, leading 
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to misconceptions (Schoemaker, 1993). While the primacy of organizations is a prevalent assumption 
in FDI research, the study of risk particularly requires taking into account managers’ own views 
(March and Shapira, 1987). The fact that IB scholars rarely engage in the discussion of risk-taking 
with, for example, cognitive psychologists, has deprived the literature of the benefits of cross-
disciplinary conversation (Hill et al., 2012). 
 
 In this paper, we review the current empirical literature on FDI risk-taking and consolidate 
this field of study with a microfoundational framework. Different terms have been used to represent 
environmental risk in the home and host country, including country risk, institutional risk and political 
risk (see Table 1). While country risk is a multidimensional concept encompassing many types of 
country-specific conditions, institutional and political risk are more narrowly defined (Feinberg and 
Gupta, 2009). We focus on the theoretical account that could contribute to our understanding of 
MNEs’ responses to any environmental risk. Our review points to two prevalent accounts in this field 
of study – the firm-level explanation based on organizational risk-taking and the individual-level 
explanation based on managerial risk preference. Both yield numerous insights into this phenomenon. 
Yet the lack of an integrative framework leaves the question open as to why economic theory of FDI 
has generally received empirical support while individual-level of analyses conclude that managers 
display idiosyncratic tendencies to take risks (Maitland and Sammartino, 2015a; Schotter and 
Beamish, 2013). The former argues that various behavioral assumptions may be suppressed by 
managers’ fiduciary responsibility and organizational routines, so that the macro fact can be 
sufficiently accounted for by macro causality without appeals to individual actors (Greve, 2013). The 
latter contends that individual-specific histories explain variation in revealed preferences and firm 
decision-making (Buckley, Devinney, et al., 2007; Maitland and Sammartino, 2015b). Researchers 
focusing on one level of analysis will find it hard to agree with those focusing on the other as to what 
causes firms’ differential risk-taking in FDI.  
 
 We bring these separate accounts together by employing the microfoundations approach as a 
meta-framework. In general, microfoundations are about locating the proximate causes of a 
4 
 
phenomenon at levels lower than than those of itself (Foss and Pedersen, 2014). In line with previous 
studies (Felin et al., 2015), we refer to individual as “micro” or “lower-level” and organization as 
“macro” or “higher-level”. In macro management research, microfoundations are construed in a 
number of ways (Foss and Pedersen, 2014). We seek to understand organizational learning and 
capabilities in terms of managerial cognition and preference by proposing two forms of 
microfoundations closely aligned with previous studies. Firstly, the weak form emphasizes the 
explanatory primacy of the micro-level and casts spotlight on individuals as the nested antecedent to 
the macro-level phenomenon (Felin and Foss, 2005; Gavetti, 2005; Helfat and Peteraf, 2015). 
Drawing upon behavioral decision theory, we use the concept of risk propensity to represent 
individual managers’ current tendencies to take risk (George et al., 2006; Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). 
Despite the long-standing assumption of managers being risk neutral in FDI theories (Buckley and 
Casson, 2009), we posit that individual risk propensity changes and is more the result of contextual 
influences than it is of dispositional trait – i.e. one’s intrinsic risk preference. While in the studies of 
decision-making, researchers can practice infinite regress to the life history of the manager in search 
of the ultimate causes (Kish-Gephart and Campbell, 2015), our focus is to identify the 
microfoundations for the macro-level cause-effect relationship – i.e. the capabilities paradigm 
(Gavetti and Levinthal, 2004). We reformulate the relationship between firm experience and 
subsequent FDI by reference to the underlying cognitive processes at the micro level. A general 
theoretical account for FDI risk-taking is established that can be applied to any MNEs and has 
particular implications for understanding EMNEs’ behavior. Secondly, the strong form of 
microfoundations takes individuals as given and concerns the aggregation principles that scale 
individual cognition to organization-level decisions (Barney and Felin, 2013). We thus integrate 
individual-level mechanisms into the organizational context, and complete the logic chain flowing 
from firm experience through managerial cognition to firm FDI, leading to a comprehensive 
microfoundational framework for FDI risk-taking. Each link in this logic chain may be a promising 
research topic in its own right, and contributes separately to our understanding as to how relations 
between macro variables are mediated by micro-level actions (Felin et al., 2015). Yet focusing solely 
on individuals or solely on aggregation does not serve to articulate the lower level causal mechanisms. 
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Only when researchers can combine the study of managerial cognition with organization-level 
theories can we resolve the tension between the current macro-level and micro-level literatures and 
yield a fuller understanding of FDI risk-taking.  
 
Table 1 Environmental Risk Concepts in the FDI Literature 
Concept Definition Measurement Examples of empirical 
studies 
Country risk A multidimensional 
concept of risk that 
exists in the host 
country environment 
Perceived Environmental 
Uncertainty (PEU) (Miller, 
1993; Werner et al., 1996) 
Agarwal and Ramaswami 
(1992); Brouthers (2002); 
Brouthers and Brouthers 
(2001, 2003); Cui and 
Jiang (2009); Kim and 
Hwang (1992); Tseng and 
Lee (2010) 
Institutional 
risk 
Host country risk 
arising from the under-
developed institutions, 
including regulatory 
quality, rule of law, 
control of corruption 
and political instability 
World Governance 
Indicator (WGI) 
(Kaufmann et al., 2009) 
Lu et al. (2014); Oh and 
Oetzel (2011); Ramasamy 
et al. (2012); Slangen and 
Beugelsdijk (2010) 
Political risk The discretionary 
policymaking capacities 
as a result of 
insufficient checks and 
balances upon political 
actors of the host 
country 
Political Constraints Index 
(POLCON) (Henisz, 2000) 
Alcantara and Mitsuhashi 
(2012); Delios and 
Henisz (2000); Delios 
and Henisz (2003a); 
Delios and Henisz 
(2003b); Demirbag et al. 
(2007); Garcia-Canal and 
Guillén (2008); Henisz 
and Delios (2001, 2004); 
Holburn and Zelner 
(2010); Slangen (2013) 
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 This paper contributes to the literature on FDI decision-making in two respects. First, we 
reconcile the mixed findings by organizational risk studies, and provide a theoretical lens for 
managerial risk studies to search for the lower-level source of heterogeneity. This addresses the 
limitations of the organizational risk studies where direct causal relations between macro variables are 
assumed. By casting light on the missing role of the managers through the lens of risk-taking, we also 
complement the conventional economic determinism of FDI theories. Second, we internalize the 
individual-level account of risk-taking into the organizational context in order to propose a causal 
mechanism underlying the observed relationship between firm experience and firms’ FDI risk-taking. 
Both social interactional and corporate contextual factors are considered. This addresses the 
limitations of the managerial risk studies where the way in which individual managers’ perceptions 
and preferences are translated into firm-level outcomes remains under-specified (Powell et al., 2011), 
and is distinct from the behavioural strategy approach where individual-level concepts and 
mechanisms are directly borrowed and applied to the organization level (Gavetti et al., 2005). By 
taking into account firm experience as the proximate cause of managerial cognition and the way in 
which managerial cognition transforms to firm-level strategic decisions, this comprehensive 
framework has the potential to consolidate the current literature and resolve the tension between 
organizational risk and managerial risk research.  
 
 In Section 2, we review the extant empirical literature on risk in FDI, and discuss the tensions 
and limitations of the current approaches. In Section 3.1 and 3.2, we explore the nature of the risk to 
justify an individual-level theoretical mechanism, built on the concept of risk propensity drawn from 
behavioral decision theory. Section 3.3 describes the microfoundations of the dominant capabilities 
paradigm by reformulating the relationship between firm experience and FDI. This is not an 
alternative approach to the capabilities paradigm at another level of analysis, but a starting point for a 
holistic framework for understanding FDI risk-taking, which requires incorporating the social context 
in which FDI decisions are made. Section 4 illustrates how individual-level mechanisms may interact 
with organizational theories to aggregate to firm actions, leading to the comprehensive 
microfoundational framework. Implications for future research are discussed in Section 5, by 
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reference to the internalization theory and the Uppsala model, as well as new avenues for empirical 
inquiries. 
 
2 Risk in the FDI literature 
We review the extant empirical research that explicitly incorporates risk or uncertainty into 
theoretical development or that directly operationalizes the concepts in empirical testing, or both, in 
attempts to explain FDI entry, governance and commitment decisions. We started with a keyword 
search of “risk”, “uncertainty” and “hazard” in the abstracts to retrieve the relevant articles from five 
core IB journals (International Business Review, Journal of International Business Studies, Journal of 
International Management, Journal of World Business, and Management International Review) and 
used cross-citations to identify other papers that were not captured by the keyword search but fell 
within our sampling criteria. 93 articles are identified, covering the time period from 1976 to 2015 
(see Appendix). We find that, chronologically, risk studies in IB move from aggregate analysis to firm 
heterogeneity and, most recently, shift toward managerial heterogeneity. Tensions exist as to whether 
organizational risk-taking and managerial risk preference is the most appropriate level of analysis. 
 
2.1 Organizational risk-taking 
Early international trade research spawned aggregate analyses of FDI flows. The underlying 
theoretical logic is that country risk is viewed as one of location disadvantages that firms try to avoid 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Drawing upon country-level data, the aggregate analyses present mixed 
findings. Whilst some report a negative effect of political risk on FDI (Bekaert et al., 2014; Levis, 
1979; Schneider and Frey, 1985), others fail to find a significant relationship (Asiedu, 2002; Bennett 
and Green, 1972; Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Kobrin, 1976). The inconclusive evidence runs 
counter to the anecdotal evidence that political risk is of the most concern to managers in choosing 
investment locations (Kobrin et al., 1980; Nigh, 1985). 
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In response, IB researchers have cast the spotlight on the firms that make risky investments. 
The firm as the unit of analysis and firm-level data allow researchers to study the effect of risk on 
investment behaviors other than location choices, including entry mode, equity stake in subsidiary and 
various expansion patterns. These studies pay particular attention to firms’ heterogeneous tendencies 
to take risks and ascribe the phenomenon to industry sector (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003; 
Brouthers et al., 2002) and firms’ capabilities (Tseng and Lee, 2010). Most notably, it is found that 
previous experience in risky environments has a positive effect on subsequent entry to risky countries 
(Del Sol and Kogan, 2007; Delios and Henisz, 2000; Delios and Henisz, 2003b; Fernández-Méndez et 
al., 2015; Holburn and Zelner, 2010). Researchers attribute this empirical regularity to the 
organization-level capabilities since organizational learning theory posits that economic agents and 
naturally, firms, gain informational advantages that can be redeployed in the neighborhood of their 
past courses of action (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008).  
 
2.2 Managerial risk preference 
Most organization-level studies leave open the question as to what extent observable 
characteristics of the environment can sufficiently reflect managers’ subjective perception of the 
environmental risk, which often vary with contextual factors and individual information processing 
abilities (Milliken, 1987). Risk-taking is, after all, a matter of strategic choice, and it is the managers 
who make the choice. This notion has led a number of studies to employ a more micro-level lens on 
managerial heterogeneity. International entrepreneurship (IE) researchers have examined the effect of 
managers’ risk perceptions on entry mode choices (Forlani et al., 2008) and speed of 
internationalization (Acedo and Jones, 2007). Particular attention has been paid to the way in which 
managers define risk and employ perceptual measurement scales accordingly. Kiss et al. (2013), in 
particular, define internationalization risk bias as the difference between objective risk indicators and 
managers’ subjective risk perceptions, which explains post entry international scope.  
 
Perceptual studies of risk, Henisz (2000) argues, suffer from an endogeneity issue. This has 
led follow-up studies to focus on managers’ and shareholders’ intrinsic characteristics. Researchers 
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draw upon agency theory to delineate the heterogeneous risk preference of various groups of agents. 
Rather than being measured directly as an individual-level trait, risk preference is inferred from firm 
behavior in FDI, including equity stake in foreign subsidiaries (Filatotchev et al., 2007), scale and 
scope of internationalization (George et al., 2005), the act of internationalization and entry mode 
(Liang et al., 2012), and location choices (Strange et al., 2009). Most recently, the level of analysis 
has matched up with the level of theory. Building on cognition research, researchers focus on the 
heterogeneous ways in which individual managers evaluate host country political risk, and how 
individual-level experience accounts for this heterogeneity and compensates for the lack of 
organizational routines regarding risk-taking (Maitland and Sammartino, 2015a). This remedies the 
assumption by the capabilities paradigm that individuals are a priori homogeneous or individual 
characteristics are randomly distributed (Felin and Foss, 2005). 
 
2.3 Limitations of the current approaches 
 Both organization-level and individual-level accounts have generated important insights and 
provided contingency perspectives as to why some firms are less deterred by host country 
environmental risk than others, thereby unveiling a distinct source of competitive advantage for 
MNEs (Oetzel and Oh, 2014). Yet both suffer from limitations that have hindered theoretical 
development. Coleman’s (1990) “bathtub” model of social science explanation summarizes the 
tension between the current approaches (see Figure 1). The organization-level account, represented by 
arrow 4, is predicated on the assumption that macro mechanisms can sufficiently account for the 
macro fact to be explained, thereby attributing the differential risk-taking behavior to firm capabilities 
(Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2011). This is, in fact, a post hoc rationalization of firms’ behavior 
(Liesch et al., 2011). Analyzing a macro-level phenomenon without direct evidence of its generative 
mechanism would inevitably leave findings open to alternative explanations (Felin and Foss, 2005). 
Although capability by definition does confer a potential competitive advantage, it neither is directly 
observed nor would necessarily be an antecedent to FDI decisions (Hashai and Buckley, 2014). 
Insufficient attention has been paid to the decision-making process and a negligible role assigned to 
the decision makers. The individual-level account, in contrast, is predicated on the assumption that 
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managerial cognition is a non-trivial source of heterogeneity in macro outcomes and needs to be taken 
into account in variance analyses (Kiss et al., 2013; Schotter and Beamish, 2013). Individual 
heterogeneity is primarily accounted for by the most proximate causes – personal traits and life 
histories (arrow 2) (Buckley, Devinney, et al., 2007; Maitland and Sammartino, 2015a; Maitland and 
Sammartino, 2015b). This line of research lacks a coherent theoretical lens by which cause-effect 
relationship can be well explained, and the link between individual cognition and firms’ decisions is 
taken for granted rather than theorized or tested (arrow 3).  
 
Figure 1 Coleman's General Model of Social Science Explanation 
 
 
The two approaches run in parallel and each may account for some of the variance in the 
macro-level phenomenon. Unsettled is the question whether the individual-level account can provide 
a much needed causal mechanism for the observed macro-macro links. This question becomes 
particularly salient when researchers seek to explain the effect of experience on FDI risk-taking. 
While the organization-level account cannot reveal the underlying mechanism by which firm 
experience induces firm risk-taking, the individual-level account focuses only on how life histories 
affect managerial cognition in order not to conflate firm experience with individual experience 
(Buckley, Devinney, et al., 2007; Maitland and Sammartino, 2015a). It is also difficult for micro-level 
research to depict the way in which individual cognition contributes to firms’ strategic decisions ex 
post (cf. Schotter and Beamish, 2013). Put differently, arrow 1 and 3 remain missing, and the two 
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approaches remain paralleled sources of heterogeneity. Researchers focusing on one level of analysis 
will come to a very different conclusion as to what is behind FDI risk-taking, compared to those 
focusing on the other. The fact that IB literature has viewed FDI risk-taking as one of the major 
competitive advantages of EMNEs makes its explanations of particular theoretical importance. The 
lack of interaction between higher-level and lower-level accounts has deprived the literature of the 
opportunity to unveil the mechanisms through which firm experience influences FDI decisions, 
despite it being an enduring topic of interest in IB (Martin and Salomon, 2003).  
 
3 Risk study in IB: In Search of Microfoundations 
 We argue that, to integrate the macro and micro accounts, the first and foremost step is to 
explore the role of the managers – the lower-level vehicle on which the observed higher-level actions 
are nested. Examining how individual managers’ behavioral attitudes matter provide the most 
proximate mechanism through which organizational variables affect organizational decision-making. 
This goes beyond establishing the empirical regularity as though some identifiable firm characteristics 
would automatically lead to certain strategic decisions (Felin et al., 2015).  
 
 Our microfoundations approach is built on the discussion of the nature of risk. Review of the 
literature suggests that intuitive use of the risk concept has led it to being conflated with various 
location-specific characteristics such as cultural and historical ties (Strange et al., 2009), governance 
cost (Teece, 1983; Werner et al., 1996) and management challenges (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 
1992). An unintended consequence is that risk studies in IB remain remotely connected with other 
disciplinary literatures, particular on behavioral strategy, which have proposed conceptual 
frameworks for risk-taking strategies based on sound decision theories and established causal 
understanding using experimental methods (Bateman and Zeithaml, 1989; Simon et al., 2000; Thaler 
and Johnson, 1990). Drawing on behavioral decision theory, we describe the microfoundations of 
risk-taking in FDI, which builds on the concept of risk propensity. 
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3.1 The nature of “risk” 
 In IB theory, there is a consensus that FDI decisions are made by MNE headquarters, who 
select from a discrete set of alternatives in the optimal interest of the MNEs based on a calculative 
analysis of projected revenues vis-à-vis transaction costs (Buckley and Casson, 1976). When 
investment return is known, risk should not matter (Buckley, Devinney, et al., 2007). Nevertheless, 
under most of the existing studies lies the risk aversion assumption in human nature held by 
neoclassical economists and agency theorists (Chiles and McMackin, 1996; Eisenhardt, 1989), as 
evidenced by the common hypothesis that country risk is negatively associated with foreign entry. An 
often unnoticed assumption in this approach is that risk is treated as an objective feature of the 
exogenous environment so that MNEs take risk as given and adjust the amount of resources to be 
committed to the specific market (Brouthers, 1995). While this implicit view is widely shared by 
previous studies, it leaves the role of managers negligible in the decision-making process (Devinney, 
2011).  
 
3.1.1 Subjectivity 
In strategic choices including FDI, risk involves ex-ante evaluation of future outcomes (Yates 
and Stone, 1992) and “exists in the eyes of the beholder” (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2011: 203). 
Under the uncertainty of disequilibrium, a location choice made to maximize risk-adjusted return may 
be judged as involving unwarrantedly high risk when assessed ex-post using country risk indicators 
developed by outside observers from a post equilibrium stance (Liesch et al., 2011). An immediate 
reflection of the subjective nature of risk is that the buyers of political risk insurance rarely agree on 
the price the issuers charge (Henisz, 2003). 
 
According to behavioral decision theory, risk arises from both the probability and the 
magnitude of loss (George et al., 2006; March and Shapira, 1987). This definition departs from the 
instability of the environment per se and focuses on the adverse impact of environmental change on 
the firm. Weick (1979: 125) contends that “decision-makers in organizations intervene between the 
environment and its effects inside the organization, which means that selection criteria become lodged 
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more in the decision-makers than in the environment”. Managerial control over the environment 
constitutes the missing piece that previous studies of international risk have rarely considered. When 
managers evaluate an entry opportunity, they tend to rely on a biased overestimation of their own 
ability rather than external information of the unbiased performance distribution in a market (Wu and 
Knott, 2006). The predictions on the riskiness of a choice are colored by managers’ perceived ability 
to mitigate the negative consequences through reactive strategies and anticipatory plans (Bingham and 
Eisenhardt, 2011; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2011; George et al., 2006; March and Shapira, 1987).  
 
Further, different managers sacrifice different alternatives at the moment of choice as 
dependent on the choice set constructed. The observation that prior decision narrows down the range 
of the choices at a later stage of the FDI decision-making process is consistent with the nested 
structure discussed in the general choice modelling literature (Louviere et al., 2010; Tallman and 
Shenkar, 1994) and behavioral strategy theory (Gavetti et al., 2012). While managers commonly 
employ economic thinking to screen out inefficient options at the consideration stage, they tend to 
switch to a different set of criteria and focus on minimizing the risk when making the final location 
choice among the shortlisted alternatives (Buckley, Devinney, et al., 2007; Mudambi and Navarra, 
2003). A range of individual-level factors may influence this selection process (Schotter and Beamish, 
2013), such that a risky option in one choice set may be the least risky one in another. Without 
knowing the full choice sets it is hard to estimate the marginal contribution of risk in the final 
decision. Therefore, FDI studies need to take into account the “risk” as it appeared in the decision-
making process rather than in the eyes of the researchers. 
 
3.1.2 Exogenous and endogenous risk 
In aggregate analyses of FDI, risk is entirely exogenous in that MNEs are assumed to respond 
passively to the environmental characteristics of the host countries. The organization-level accounts 
adopting the contingency perspective move one step forward to posit that, rather than purely assessing 
the environment per se, firms take into consideration their ability to enact a favorable firm-
environment relationship and develop entry strategies in accordance (Ring et al., 1990). This view is 
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also consistent with behavioral decision theorists’ focus on “control” in distinguishing managerial 
risk-taking from a gambling scenario (March and Shapira, 1987). Theoretically, one can draw a 
spectrum along which MNEs, at one extreme, passively accept all environmental risks as given and, at 
the other extreme, proactively seek to influence all risks to which they would be exposed. The 
distinction between exogenous environment that cannot be influenced and endogenous environment 
that results from firms’ influential behavior has important theoretical implications (Alvarez and 
Barney, 2007; Weick, 1979). Conflating exogenous and endogenous risk has led to confusing 
conclusions on managers’ risk-taking tendencies (Wu and Knott, 2006). 
 
An illustrative example is the nature of political risk. The political institutions literature 
suggests that political risk is an endogenous variable as MNEs have “the ability to block adverse 
and/or promote favorable policy change” within the given political structure (Henisz, 2003: 181). 
Firms face such an eventuality in the ex-post policy environment that the favorable terms negotiated at 
the time of entry may be altered by the host country government in an obsolescing bargaining 
scenario, so that managers have to factor their ability to guard against the overturning, alteration or 
reinterpretation of policy commitments into the entry decision (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Delios 
and Henisz, 2003a). A common “non-market” strategy is to leverage the influence of the relevant 
political actors, the local electorate and the international and multilateral lending agencies (Henisz, 
2000). Differential lobbying skills to engage these actors as a surrogate may lead the identical location 
to pose varying level of risk to two otherwise similar MNEs. However, there are other types of 
political risk such as societal turmoil, ethnic conflict and civil warfare that result from the political 
dynamics between various branches of the government (Dai et al., 2013; Henisz, 2003). These risks 
arise when the power handover is contested via uprising by those who seek to challenge the political 
status quo, and often lead to asset seizure in the light of antiforeigner sentiment (Maitland and 
Sammartino, 2015a). Unlike the “status-quo” setting, MNEs may have little ability to forestall the 
occurrence of violence under turbulent circumstances and have to take the risk as given. Previous 
research suggests that firms respond to endogenous and exogenous risks in different fashion since the 
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capacity of using insurance to hedge against exchange (exogenous) risk vis-à-vis policy (endogenous) 
risk varies substantially (Henisz and Zelner, 2010). 
 
3.2 Risk propensity – an integrating concept 
 Behavioral decision theorists have developed the construct of risk propensity to substitute for 
the trait approach predicated upon individual disposition (George et al., 2006; Sitkin and Pablo, 
1992). Risk propensity refers to an individual’s current tendency to take or avoid risk (Sitkin and 
Pablo, 1992). While individuals always hold a dispositional attitude toward risk-taking in general, the 
real tendency to take risk is overwhelmed by contextual factors (Sitkin and Weingart, 1995). 
Behavioral research proposes that, to economize on the scarce attention capacity, boundedly rational 
managers form simplified cognitive representations of the complex environment in decision-making 
(Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). In a similar vein, risk propensity reflects a coherent cognitive structure, 
or “heuristics”, for dealing with a range of similar problems without reference to the details of any 
specific ones (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011). A risk situation can thus be reduced to workable 
dimensions so that a rational actor would maximize her utility against the overall risk propensity – the 
weighted sum of the constituent dimensions, be it exogenous or endogenous risk (March, 1981). Thus 
one might show more or less tolerance for risk depending on the decision domain (Weber et al., 2002) 
and the specific dimension of country risk being discussed (Wu and Knott, 2006). A straightforward 
manifestation of the power of the concept of risk propensity lies in the fact that it can be used to 
address the persistent myth that entrepreneurs are not fundamentally more inclined to risk than the 
others (Stewart and Roth, 2001) by identifying a context-specific risk-seeking orientation only 
devoted to chasing business opportunities but not in other life domains (Palich and Bagby, 1995). 
 
 Behavioral research has ascribed the variation in individuals’ risk propensity to an array of 
cognitive factors (Schoemaker, 1993), the most prominent being performance feedback. As an 
integrating concept, risk propensity can accommodate competing theories that predict varied effect of 
previous performance on risk-taking. For instance, prospect theory suggests that framing creates a 
steeper utility curve on the loss side of a reference point than on the gain side so that poor 
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performance may induce decision-makers to bet on the upside potential and make risky choices 
(Bateman and Zeithaml, 1989; Bazerman, 1984; Weber and Milliman, 1997). Quasi-hedonic editing 
theory, in contrast, argues that prior failure in goal attainment leads decision-makers to set lower goals 
and take less risk in subsequent decisions (Slattery and Ganster, 2002). The most pertinent 
explanation in the strategic decision context may be the one provided by managerial decision research 
(March and Shapira, 1987). Studies show that managers will persist in taking risks if prior outcomes 
are positive, giving rise to a sense of potency and self-serving attribution (Osborn and Jackson, 1988; 
Sitkin and Weingart, 1995). The outcome history of forestalling the occurrence of unfavorable 
scenarios and mitigating the impact on the foreign affiliate provides readily available evidence to 
managers about the extent to which their skills, talents and capabilities can help control the risk in this 
particular task (March and Shapira, 1987). Appearing to be a satisficing rather than an optimizing 
solution, the tendency to follow experience when constructing the choice set can be regarded as a 
rational process of adaptive learning that aims to reproduce past successes (Denrell and March, 2001; 
Hutzschenreuter et al., 2007), and is coined “feedback strategy” in the behavioral strategy literature 
(Greve, 2013). 
 
More importantly, risk propensity can account for the subjective nature of the risk, which is 
assumed away by macro-level studies. Past successes and failures of the individual managers are 
translated into stereotypes and provide them with a frame of reference and a habitual way of 
evaluating new situations (Garud and Rappa, 1994). For example, managers’ experience with a 
particular set of entry modes serves to constitute the “consideration set” for subsequent entry mode 
decisions in order to reduce the range of mode options to be evaluated (Benito et al., 2009). Risk 
propensity can also account for the distinction between endogenous and exogenous risk. As prospect 
theory was developed in such task settings that odds are exogenously given, the loss aversion thesis is 
more likely to hold when non-controllable, external threat is involved (Holmes et al., 2011). 
Conversely, risky behaviour is more likely when managers perceive a sense of control over the risk in 
question (George et al., 2006). This may explain why previous firm-level research has found mixed 
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results on the relationship between experience and risky entry (Oetzel and Oh, 2014; Oh and Oetzel, 
2016). 
 
While an organization-level account can only infer the mechanism from the empirical 
relations between two macro variables, individual-level theories emphasize individual actor-hood and 
specify the causal conditions for risk-taking behavior. In the light of multiple realization of a macro-
level outcome, experimentation can test directly the competing hypotheses by different theories, and 
examine under what conditions any theory would prevail (Devinney, 2013). To illustrate the 
usefulness of the concept, we reformulate the theoretical mechanism between experience and FDI 
using risk propensity, and show how the individual-level account can complement the dominant 
capabilities paradigm. 
 
3.3 Microfoundations of the capabilities paradigm 
Existing FDI studies have primarily attributed the relationship between experience and FDI 
entry into risky locations to firm-level capabilities (Fernández-Méndez et al., 2015), not least in the 
case of EMNEs. A typical argument is that EMNEs have honed unique capabilities and expertise in 
dealing with poor institutional governance in the home country, and such capabilities are transferable 
to other developing countries of a similar level of institutional development (Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc, 2008; Del Sol and Kogan, 2007). This is not an unreasonable argument from the behavioral 
strategy perspective since the capacity to perform an activity tends to improve with experience (Zollo 
and Winter, 2002). However, research shows that simply gaining experience is not sufficient for 
creating capability (Haleblian et al., 2006; Hayward, 2002), and capability is not necessary for a firm 
to enter risky locations (Mitchell et al., 1992). What is learned from experience is not specified by this 
literature, calling for a micro-level explanation of what underpins the observed decisions (Bingham 
and Eisenhardt, 2011; Bingham et al., 2007). 
 
The search for microfoundations is particularly germane when the decision context changes. 
Cognition research suggests that individuals’ performance of mental activities depends on their 
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training and experience in the same task domain (Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996). As MNEs move from 
one country to another, the link between experience and capability may become tenuous. The 
specificity of a firm’s routines hinders deployment of the existing capabilities outside its current 
geographic markets (Powell and Rhee, 2015). For MNEs, the inherited knowledge and home country 
imprint cannot always transfer to other similar markets (Giarratana and Torrisi, 2010), and experience 
of engaging with local stakeholders does not automatically lead to expertise in political hazard 
assessment (Maitland and Sammartino, 2015a). Experimental evidence suggests that even when we 
impose a utility maximization model on managerial decision-making, the behavioral postulate – i.e. 
experience affects risk-taking – is still evident (Buckley, Devinney, et al., 2007). If it is not capability, 
what induces the risky decisions? 
 
Microfoundations research suggests that individual cognition poses a non-trivial source of 
heterogeneity for firm behavior (Foss and Pedersen, 2014). Individuals’ mental representations shape 
decision heuristics concerning what informational cues are indicative of risk, where to find that 
information, and what constitutes the evaluation criteria for interpreting the information (Bingham 
and Eisenhardt, 2011; Bingham et al., 2007), so that managers adopting different heuristics to search 
for and analyze information would hold a higher or lower estimation of the probability of loss 
associated with investing in a given project. When the context changes and information is ambiguous, 
boundedly rational managers naturally employ analogical reasoning to extrapolate from their existing 
knowledge by making assumptions beyond what is firmly known (Gary et al., 2012; Jones and 
Casulli, 2014; Lipshitz and Strauss, 1997), in order to anticipate roughly the consequences of the 
alternative courses of action (Gavetti et al., 2005). The complexity of the individuals’ mental 
representations, in terms of the number of causal actors, linkages and their directions, is a function of 
decision makers’ context-specific experience (Maitland and Sammartino, 2015a; Maitland and 
Sammartino, 2015b). Whether managers can generalize their experience to another context depends 
on the nature of the risk. When managers have successful experience of dealing with the power 
structures and institutions similar to those in a particular host country, they place strong belief in their 
foresight related to identifying the pitfalls associated with regulations and contracting at the time of 
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deal negotiation and also in their precautionary strategies (Oh and Oetzel, 2016), including partnering 
with certain stakeholders, that can best block adverse policy changes and remove the firm’s image of 
being an exploiter (Ring et al., 1990). The sense of confidence may be further amplified by social 
praise for managerial success and prowess (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2011; Hayward and Hambrick, 
1997; Hayward et al., 2004; Li and Tang, 2013). In contrast, the experience with exogenous risk is 
less of a cue to managers about their ability to control the risk and thus hardly transfers to other 
contexts (Oetzel and Oh, 2014). This explains the macro-level puzzle as to why experience has 
varying influence on MNEs’ responses to endogenous political risk and exogenous macroeconomic 
turbulence of the host country (Garcia-Canal and Guillén, 2008). 
 
However, analogical reasoning is not necessarily compatible with the capabilities argument 
for two reasons. First, the macro-level studies rightly point out that the usefulness of firms’ prior 
experience hinges on the degree of structural commonality shared by two contexts (Delios and 
Henisz, 2003b; Li et al., 2015; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999), e.g. regulatory environment (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2006; Perkins, 2014) and cultural similarity (Hong and Lee, 2015). At the micro level, when 
commonality is only superficial, managers’ foresight resulting from analogical reasoning could be 
misleading (Miller and Ireland, 2005; O'Grady and Lane, 1996). For example, Heidenreich et al. 
(2015) find that managers tend to be overconfident about their ability to mitigate institutional 
uncertainty regarding a developing country market as they believe – based on prior experience in a 
developed country – that certain political strategies should work in their favor. This illusion of control 
over the environment induces managers to underestimate the external threats and drives an 
unwarrantedly risky entry decision. This is particularly prevalent when the new environment does not 
provide clear-cut information on the efficacy of the actions (Gavetti et al., 2012) and when an 
individual is deeply committed to an old domain (Helfat and Peteraf, 2015). Second, the risk 
propensity based on previous experience may itself be unwarranted. The assumed capability 
underlying the risk-taking tendency could be a result of self-serving bias and superstitious learning 
(Zollo, 2009), which prompt managers to rely on semi-automatic processing and prevent them from 
attending to the unique characteristics of the focal context (Castellaneta and Zollo, 2015). In these 
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cases, experience is not translated into capabilities or competitive advantages, yet may still induce 
managers to make risky FDI decisions.  
 
Following this logic, we can reformulate the argument underlying EMNEs’ entry into other 
risky countries. Since home country institutions shape managers’ mental models, EMNE managers 
are more tolerant of the risk that contracts may not be enforceable, compared to MNE managers from 
developed countries where enforceable contracts are the norm (Hoskisson et al., 2000). The tendency 
to look at a novel environment through the lens of a domestic mindset is strengthened when the novel 
environment features noisy information (Nadkarni et al., 2011; Nadkarni and Perez, 2007) and when 
managers have an emotional attachment to successful past strategies (Gavetti, 2012). Compared to 
MNE managers, it is more difficult for EMNE managers, who in general have a shorter history of 
international venturing, to counter this tendency and adopt solutions that violate the domestic mindset 
(Contractor, 2013). Ceteris paribus, EMNE managers are more likely to opt for those countries where 
the local market institutions fit with their domestic mindsets. These countries are often rated as risky 
by institutional risk or political risk indices.  
 
Nevertheless, this is not to deny that EMNEs may have a home-country-based advantage. As 
emerging markets see constant and rapid evolution of competitive and regulatory conditions, EMNE 
managers have been required to attend regularly to the environmental changes for emerging 
opportunities (Helfat and Peteraf, 2015) and to the threats brought by certain institutions – institutions 
commonly featured in emerging countries in general (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Ramos and Ashby, 
2013). Managerial attention, their interpretations of environmental cues, and responsiveness to 
institutional changes drive firms’ tendency to act on opportunities in other similar fast-growing 
markets (Dau, 2012; Del Sol and Kogan, 2007). This tendency may be further reinforced by a self-
serving attribution of the positive home country performance, which is likely to be driven by the pro-
market reform rather than the internal skills (Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009). In contrast, 
opportunities for nurturing superior cognitive capabilities are limited in developed countries where 
markets are efficient. When evaluating emerging markets, managers are thus bounded by their ability 
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to overcome the behavioral failures that prevent them from sensing cognitively distant opportunities 
conditioned by a different set of institutions from what they are familiar with (Gavetti, 2012). That 
said, while this superior cognitive capability of information search and processing may be a source of 
advantage that helps EMNEs tap into the growing developing country markets, it may not necessarily 
guarantee better performance of the firm. 
 
4 A Microfoundational Framework of Risk-taking in FDI 
 While employing the concept of managerial risk propensity can yield insights into the 
behavioral foundation of the firm-level internationalization, the microfoundations approach needs to 
go beyond assigning explanatory primacy to individual attitude and preference (Barney and Felin, 
2013). It is likely that managers’ preference accounts for a non-trivial portion of the variance in firms’ 
internationalization behavior (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2007; Schotter and Beamish, 2013). Yet 
question remains as to whether and how the nature of the borrowed concept – e.g. cognition – and its 
associated micro-level mechanisms would change when applied to a specific social context (Felin et 
al., 2015). Behavioral strategy literature draws simple analogy between organizational routines and 
individuals’ mental representations in that history is retrieved as representation and patterns by 
individuals and as routines by organizations (Levitt and March, 1988). In the IB context, the way in 
which managerial cognition influences firms’ FDI decisions is, more often than not, assumed rather 
than theorized (Aharoni et al., 2011). Confusion arises as to whether individuals’ cognitive capability 
and “mindfulness” (Levinthal and Rerup, 2006) remain a significant explanation in the organizational 
context (Gavetti, 2012). Although the risk propensity concept we draw upon has been tested in 
various managerial task settings (e.g., Sitkin and Weingart, 1995), a complete microfoundational 
framework would move one step further than attributing macro-level heterogeneity to observable 
micro-level characteristics, and require understanding of the micro-macro link specific to the focal 
social context (Barney and Felin, 2013) – i.e. how individuals’ risk propensity transforms to 
organizational risk-taking decisions. 
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 On the manager’s side, a straightforward principle concerns how top managers formalise, 
legitimise, and alter decision rules at the organisation level. Individual decision heuristics imply a 
degree of codification and mindfulness (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011). Shared cognition is 
interpersonally negotiated in cases lacking the informational basis for foresight (Garud and Rappa, 
1994). Transferring individual heuristics to organization-level decision rules requires managers to 
convince other internal stakeholders of the efficacy of the personal heuristics and change their 
worldviews when meeting resistance (Schotter and Beamish, 2013). Skills are needed to persuade 
stakeholders that the opportunity presented falls into a specific mental representation as per 
experience (Gavetti, 2012). The manager’s cognitive capability of influencing others’ mental 
representations creates an important source of heterogeneity in organization-level decisions. This 
capability may be of less importance in certain organizational structures – for example in firms 
controlled by owner-managers. 
 
On the organization’s side, the aggregation is hardly a linear function of its top managers’ 
characteristics and backgrounds. Organizational context may both amplify and suppress the effect of 
individual cognition. Psychology research suggests that social interaction narrows the scope of 
cognitive thinking and analogy and thereby reduces the productivity of group discussion (Diehl and 
Stroebe, 1991). Diversity of beliefs among the top management team (TMT) may further hamper 
decision comprehensiveness and extensiveness (Miller et al., 1998). Moreover, the social context of 
the corporate elite commonly sees managers engage in flattery and opinion conformity toward CEOs 
who have high social status in order to advance personal interests. This tendency amplifies CEOs’ 
overconfidence about the efficacy of their past actions in strategic decision-making (Park et al., 2011). 
In contrast, firm-level monitoring arrangements are often put in place to override cognitive biases and 
align managerial behavior to shareholders’ interests. Monitoring is set to initiate controlled mental 
processing and a reality check on managers’ personal beliefs as to the similarity of the focal context to 
previous ones and the validity of their self-serving attribution. A prominent monitoring arrangement is 
the board. CEO’s power over the board determines the extent to which individual preference transfers 
to organization-level decisions. Research shows that when performance declines, board of directors 
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will increase their attention toward monitoring the CEO’s behavior while CEO duality reduces this 
tendency (Tuggle et al., 2010). 
 
Aggregation does not just include checks and balances at the boardroom. On the one hand, 
conflict between organizational members arises when the manager insists that heuristic processing is 
necessary and effective in such strategic decision situations that information is ambiguous and time is 
pressing (Helfat and Peteraf, 2015). The transition from lower-level to higher-level is thus 
complicated by the circulation of power and political coalition within the organization. Outcome 
history not only affects managers’ risk propensity but also alters the distribution of power and 
influence among the members of the decision group. In the case of performance shortfall, the CEO’s 
power will be contested by other senior management who seeks to redefine the firm’s strategic agenda 
(Zhang, 2006). On the other hand, aggregation principles are not necessarily nested at the top 
management or board level. Traveling managers’ personal preferences, particularly based on 
experience of inconvenience in previous trips, may affect the investment location shortlist by shaping 
the way in which the advantages and disadvantages of potential sites are compiled and communicated 
to other organizational members (Schotter and Beamish, 2013; Welch et al., 2007). This results in a 
different range of choice sets presented to top managers, which eventually contributes to the variance 
in the final decision.  
 
 Figure 2 summarizes the microfoundational framework of risk-taking in FDI. While the 
capabilities paradigm links the macro-level variables and organizational actions (arrow 1), the 
microfoundational framework (arrows 2–3) poses an alternative explanation based on individual-level 
cognition and risk propensity underlying the observed empirical regularity. Section 3.3 explicated 
how firm experience influences managerial cognition (arrow 2), which in turn may account for the 
heterogeneity in firms’ FDI entry into risky locations. Section 4 complements this account by 
delineating the potential dynamics through which individual managers’ cognition scales to 
organization-level decision-making. This seeks to open the black box of the micro-macro link (arrow 
3), and does not undermine the value of individual-level concepts and mechanisms (Felin and Foss, 
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2005). As with any scientific inquiry, the microfoundations research needs to be built on well-
specified initial conditions (Barney and Felin, 2013). The individual is a natural initial condition in the 
studies of decision-making since the way in which individuals collect and process information guides 
the construction of choice sets among which the final decision is made. This is undoubtedly crucial in 
the light of increased CEO effect and manager fixed effects on firms’ investment behaviour and 
performance (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Quigley and Hambrick, 2015). With arrow 3 in place, the 
individual-level account is no longer a mere source of heterogeneity but an indispensable mechanism 
in theorizing about the macro outcomes (cf. Schotter and Beamish, 2013). 
 
Figure 2 A Meta-framework for Understanding FDI Risk-taking 
 
Adapted from Coleman (1990) 
 
5 Implications for Future Research 
5.1 Microfoundations and FDI theories  
 Major FDI theories have been criticized for the lack of microfoundations (Aharoni et al., 
2011). Both internalization theory and the Uppsala model are founded on the static assumption of 
managerial risk preference in search of parsimonious theory building while downplaying the 
implications of variable risk preference. Given that both theories are essentially theories of managerial 
choice (Chiles and McMackin, 1996; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), the search of microfoundations 
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may benefit them in meaningful ways. We briefly illustrate how the microfoundational perspective 
based on risk propensity may alter their predictions on entry mode and location choice. 
 
5.1.1 Internalization theory 
Internalization theory views the firm as a stylized decision maker who makes the choice on 
organizational boundary while taking individuals’ preferences and attitudes as given (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976, 2009). Nevertheless, Chiles and McMackin (1996) highlight the role of managers who 
make the decision and argue that there are other behavioral bases for managerial actions that may 
interact with the economic rationality of cost minimization. Others have explicitly called for relaxing 
the assumption of risk neutrality to enhance the validity of the theory in predicting the governance 
structure of MNEs (Buckley and Strange, 2011). Managers’ risk preference may shift the switch point 
of asset specificity level at which hierarchical structure will be preferred. Yet in the FDI literature, 
little is known as to how managers’ risk preference vary. Behavioral research on risk propensity 
effectively links experience with governance structure to provide an ex-ante predictor for boundary 
choice. 
 
The difference between exogenous risk and endogenous risk suggests that not all experience 
can have an influence on risk propensity. Experience with natural disaster, technological failure and 
terrorist attack does not moderate the negative impact of such risk on subsequent foreign entry (Oetzel 
and Oh, 2014). For those who have beaten the odds in the past, successful passive response to 
exogenous risk may be attributed to luck rather than competence (Clapham and Schwenk, 1991). One 
implication for internalization theory is that the influence of experience on hierarchical structure vs. 
external market may be asymmetrical. Positive experience of partnerships, including joint venture, 
alliance and even low-integration acquisition can transfer from one of these contexts to another (Zollo 
and Reuer, 2010) so as to increase managers’ tendency to take contractual risk, whereas dealing with 
exogenous risk for wholly owned subsidiary does not encourage managers to take a similar risk in 
another country (Oetzel and Oh, 2014). As experience spillover is more commonly observed in 
partnerships, the breadth and heterogeneity of previous experience may be particularly relevant to 
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contractual governance as opposed to hierarchical control (Jiménez et al., 2014; Powell and Rhee, 
2015; Reuer et al., 2002), leading economic determinism to be less accurate in predicting international 
cooperative venture formation (Hennart and Slangen, 2015; Tallman and Shenkar, 1994). In contrast, 
when exogenous risks associated with market demand and macroeconomic turbulence become the 
dominant form of risk in an FDI decision, internalization theory is likely to remain a robust 
explanatory framework. 
 
5.1.2 The Uppsala model 
The Uppsala model claims that managers are risk averse and have an inherently low level of 
maximum tolerable risk, which serves as the behavioral base for cautious, stepwise 
internationalization patterns, in terms of both location and entry mode choice (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977). All else being equal, host country experience reduces liabilities of foreignness and enhances 
the probability of survival (Zaheer, 1995) whilst general international experience creates 
organizational routines, procedures and structures for cross-border venturing (Eriksson et al., 1997). 
Both experiences encourage risk-averse managers to increase foreign market commitment (Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1990). However, behavioral research shows that managers’ tendency to take risk is a 
dynamic construct and a function of outcome history. As a descriptive theory, the Uppsala model 
should take into account variable risk preference, and examine what leads some managers to be more 
or less averse to risk than others, and how empirical anomalies can be accommodated in this view. 
 
 Risk propensity suggests that managers are not uniformly averse to all type of risk at the start 
of the internationalization process (Wu and Knott, 2006). MNEs can trade off one dimension of 
international risk against another while keeping the overall risk profile under control (Miller, 1992). 
Shrader et al. (2000) find that small firms, often reflecting the lead entrepreneurs’ behavioral 
tendencies, are able to achieve accelerated internationalization in the absence of significant network 
resources by balancing out the risks of the country entered, the mode of entry used, and the proportion 
of total firm revenue exposed to the risks of that country. Following this logic, managers with 
successful inward internationalization experience – e.g. partnering up with foreign investors in the 
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home country – may be less averse to contractual or dissemination risk so that they are more inclined 
to venture into distant locations and balance the overall project risk by means of joint venture entry, 
compared to inexperienced managers. Moreover, EMNE managers with successful domestic 
internationalization experience – i.e. venturing into the heterogeneous regional markets within the 
national border (Wiedersheim-Paul et al., 1978) – may be less deterred by political and regulatory 
risks when expanding to another developing country. These microfoundational mechanisms rested on 
home country experience provide alternative but well-founded explanations for the empirical 
anomalies to the model prediction, which so far have been partly attributed to firms’ entrepreneurial 
orientation and entrepreneurs’ intrinsic risk seeking preference (Oviatt and McDougall, 2005). 
Moreover, performance feedback in certain host countries and organizational performance pressure 
may induce managers to reverse the progressive internationalization (Garcia-Canal and Guillén, 
2008). It is reasonable to expect the proposed learning process to be more complicated and flexible 
when managers’ cognitive processes, abilities and biases are accounted for (Petersen et al., 2008; 
Zollo, 2009). 
 
5.2 Directions for empirical research 
 Current individual-level research agendas are driven by the contention that individual 
cognition accounts for a non-trivial portion of the variance in organizations’ decisions. While this is 
by all means a valid claim, research is predicated on the automatic manifestation of lower-level 
actions in higher-level outcomes. We call for more process research for two reasons. First, cognition 
is essentially a process – a process of attending, remembering and reasoning (Helfat and Peteraf, 
2015). Much of the heterogeneity occurs through different stages of this process. For example, when 
it is documented that outcome history influences risk propensity, what dimension of performance 
managers attend to is less clear. The attention-based view points to the plurality of goals (Ocasio, 
1997), and a variety of performance metrics are considered relevant by different managers (Richard et 
al., 2009). Moreover, multiple realization is possible – meaning that different combinations of two or 
more accounts can lead to the same organization-level outcome (Greve, 2013). The positive 
relationship between experience and imitative behavior may be due to ritualistic response, local 
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search or performance-driven adaption (Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002; Zollo, 2009). Each is an 
internally consistent account at the cognition level. Experimental design is required to examine the 
competing explanations of risk-taking behavior in FDI so as to identify how they interact and under 
what conditions, or in what organizational contexts, any of them would prevail (Devinney, 2013). 
Second, aggregating individual-level cognition to group-level decisions requires in-depth 
investigations into the decision process. In cases lacking direct evidence of this process, the debate 
over the preferred level of analysis for behavioral strategies can never be settled (Greve, 2013). The 
process of social interaction within the decision-making group, of communicating the attribution of 
previous performance and of persuading other internal stakeholders is of much importance in and of 
itself, and can hardly be revealed by a correlational analysis. For instance, the shifting of attention 
among performance metrics has direct implications for risk propensity, and is a dynamic process to be 
captured only by longitudinal observations. 
 
 Two issues are left unaddressed by this paper, which nevertheless sets the direction for future 
research. First, before the analogical reasoning can adapt to performance feedback, managers may 
initially make unwarrantedly risky decisions based on erroneous assumptions about the usefulness of 
experience in other contexts (Nadolska and Barkema, 2007; Petersen et al., 2008; Zeng et al., 2013). 
This is ever increasingly likely under the legitimacy-based view on political risk, which argues that 
political risk is not entirely dependent on the bargaining power dynamic between the host government 
and the foreign investor or on the degree of political constraint on the host government’s discretionary 
behavior (Stevens et al., 2015). Whether the host government and host society perceive the MNE as 
legitimate determines the level of political risk it faces. The socially constructed nature of legitimacy 
involves a complex interplay between host government, host society and home government. 
Successful experience in one country may even increase the political risk the firm would face in 
another country. The fact that MNEs misconceive their legitimacy and engage in unreasonable 
investments will be thus of greater theoretical and empirical salience.  
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Future research may benefit from the parallel development of two lines of inquiry. On the one 
hand, we need a descriptive account of how and why firms take risk in FDI decisions, as a 
complement to prediction by the conventional FDI theories. On the other hand, we need to continue 
the investigation as to when political risk or other country risk may arise, in addition to the traditional 
bargaining power approach and political institutions approach (Stevens et al., 2015). These two lines 
in combination provide a prescriptive account of the performance implications of certain FDI 
decisions. Only when the decision-making perspective matches with the performance perspective can 
we truly conclude that the contextual influence does confer on firms a distinct source of competitive 
advantage. Otherwise, the inferred “capability” may mask the mismatch between competence and 
confidence. Evidence has been found on superstitious learning and confidence trap in strategic and 
entrepreneurial decision-making (Miller, 2012; Perlow et al., 2002; Zollo, 2009), and not least in 
foreign investment (O'Grady and Lane, 1996; Petersen et al., 2008; Zeng et al., 2013). In the light of 
the emerging forms of risk such as cyber attack and social legitimacy, it is reasonable to conceive that 
MNEs are more likely than ever to misplace confidence in their ability to control the risks using 
conventional practices. These insights are yet to be incorporated in the studies of risk and FDI, which 
are currently biased toward the descriptive account. 
 
Second, IB researchers often view risk and uncertainty as interchangeable and jump from one 
to the other arbitrarily (Liesch et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2004). Employing different terminology and 
nonconvergent measures undermines the systematic building of knowledge (Hill et al., 2012). 
Identifying their conceptual distinctiveness and the implications for FDI theory building requires 
drawing upon a variety of relevant disciplinary literatures and lies beyond the scope of this study. We 
note in passing that the familiar argument that uncertainty stems from a lack of knowledge and risk is 
a result of such informational uncertainty (Carpenter et al., 2003; Figueira-de-Lemos et al., 2011; 
Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) seems too simplistic in view of Knight’s (1921) seminal work and recent 
entrepreneurship research (Alvarez and Barney, 2007). Questions remain as to whether opportunity 
discovery or opportunity creation theory best account for the role of risk and uncertainty in FDI 
decision-making (Alvarez and Barney, 2007), and whether viewing risk as “probability of loss” vs. 
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“affordable loss” influences the way in which experienced managers evaluate risky entry. Liesch et al. 
(2011) propose that the influence of risk and uncertainty on international involvement is intertwined 
with experience, cognitive biases and the context, and the result of the evolutionary process is 
inherently indeterminate due to the dynamic nature of multidirectional causality and nonlinear 
relationship. As both risk and uncertainty distinguish international settings from domestic ones, we 
suggest future research examine their different implications for FDI theories.  
 
6 Conclusions 
Explaining FDI has been the central inquiry of IB research for decades and risk and 
uncertainty are widely regarded as key determinants by researchers. In this paper, we draw attention 
to the extant empirical studies and seek to provide an alternative theorization. We conclude that a 
microfoundational perspective can advance the studies of international risk and contribute to the 
understanding of FDI. 
 
Taking up the call by previous researchers to reconsider risk and uncertainty for IB inquiries 
(Liesch et al., 2011), we review the way in which IB scholars use ex-ante risk to explain FDI 
decisions. Two dominant approaches are identified – i.e. organizational risk-taking and managerial 
risk preference – through which the current knowledge on FDI risk-taking is generated. The 
organization-level approach suggests that MNEs’ responses to host country risk vary depending on 
their experience, which essentially reflects varying level of firm capability. This explanation 
dominates the current debate as to why EMNEs can compete on the global stage in the absence of 
conventional firm-specific resources (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). The individual-level approach suggests 
that managers’ traits and characteristics including personal history shape their cognition, which 
account for a significant portion of variance in the firms’ FDI decisions. Despite the numerous 
insights they yield, both approaches draw heavily on post hoc rationalization of firms’ behavior. The 
organization-level account is open to many alternative explanations whereas the individual-level 
31 
 
account does not unveil the theoretical mechanisms underlying the link between macro variables (cf. 
Schotter and Beamish, 2013).  
 
In response, we draw upon the meta-framework of microfoundations to reformulate the 
theoretical relationship between firm experience and risk-taking. The first step is to recognize the 
importance of the managers as the most proximate cause of firm decisions. This is a legitimate 
microfoundations approach as we explain the collective phenomenon in terms of its constituent parts 
(Foss and Pedersen, 2014). Despite some scholars’ persistent calls, individual-level research is still 
under-represented in IB (Aharoni et al., 2011; Buckley, Devinney, et al., 2007; Maitland and 
Sammartino, 2015b). We argue that the individual-level account is particularly necessary in the 
studies of FDI risk-taking since country risk or political risk indicators do not account for the fact that 
managers hold varying probability distributions of future outcomes as a result of their divergent 
perceived ability to control the risk. This suggests that we focus on managers’ heterogeneous 
preferences and cognitive processes (Buckley, Devinney, et al., 2007; Helfat and Peteraf, 2015), as 
opposed to observable individual-level characteristics. Recent research on managerial mental 
representation has recognized the contribution of individual cognition to FDI decisions (Maitland and 
Sammartino, 2015b; Williams and Grégoire, 2015). However, theory is lacking in depicting the 
micro-level mechanism. To address this problem, we employ the concept of risk propensity to 
delineate how contextual variables and particularly experience influence individual managers’ risk-
taking tendency. Cognition research has proposed competing theories and established valid evidence 
on the causal effect of experience on risk propensity. The effect is most significant when the 
experience involves performance feedback in the same decision context and the risk situation is 
subject to managerial control rather than being strictly exogenous (Bateman and Zeithaml, 1989; 
Osborn and Jackson, 1988; Sitkin and Weingart, 1995). Interpretation of prior experiences as to how 
effective the coping mechanisms used would be in a given institutional environment underpins the 
change in risk propensity and leads to the imitation of previous actions when entering a new country 
(Henisz, 2003; Tallman, 1992). Individual-level overconfidence and erroneous generalization of 
experience are well documented in the literature, and may serve as microfoundations for the observed 
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regularity between organization-level collectives, which so far has been accounted for by the 
capabilities paradigm at the macro-level. We also show that nesting the relationship between 
experience and risky FDI at the individual-level does not negate EMNEs’ unique advantages 
compared to their developed country counterparts when investing abroad. 
 
While recent research examining the influence of personal experience on managerial 
preferences in making FDI decisions has yielded fresh insights (Buckley, Devinney, et al., 2007; 
Maitland and Sammartino, 2015a; Maitland and Sammartino, 2015b), this line of inquiry goes little 
beyond viewing individuals as a direct source of unexplained variance, or the critical “inputs”, in the 
firm-level decision calculus (Kiss et al., 2013; Schotter and Beamish, 2013). Although behavioral 
decision theory that we draw upon provides much needed guidance for the research on FDI risk-
taking, it too does not explicate to what extent and how managerial cognition contributes to firm-level 
strategic decisions. The microfoundations approach calls for more explicit mechanisms as to how the 
lower-level account aggregates to higher-level outcome in a specific social context. Given the 
idiosyncratic experience at the individual-level, the simplest aggregation principle would be to weight 
each TMT member’s personal experience (Athanassiou and Nigh, 2002). Yet it begs the question why 
individuals are found to have all sorts of biases while the economic theory based on rationality seems 
still supported by the data, implying more complex interactions and non-linear aggregation (Barney 
and Felin, 2013). We complete the logic chain from firm experience through managerial cognition to 
firm decisions by incorporating micro-macro transitional processes into our framework. For example, 
the power dynamics at the top management level determine the extent to which individual preferences 
and beliefs can transfer to the organizational decisions. In other words, group decision-making is not 
always less biased. Even if group discussion in the boardroom can effectively alleviate calculus flaw 
in the final decision, the information input to that calculus is often collected by frontline managers 
that carry cultural biases and self-interests motivations. This is particularly prevalent in MNEs’ 
decision-making since location evaluation would inevitably require travels and the traveling managers 
can intervene organizational decisions at the early stage by filtering out the locations they dislike 
(Schotter and Beamish, 2013). Despite that we strive to propose some specific micro-macro 
33 
 
transitional mechanisms, the microfoundational framework does not rule out unobserved 
heterogeneity in this aggregation process that cannot be predicted due to its emergent nature (Barney 
and Felin, 2013). 
 
Early research explicitly recognizes that internationalization decision-making is as much of a 
behavioral process influenced by managers’ preferences and attitudes to risk-taking as it is of rational 
calculation (Aharoni et al., 2011; Reid, 1981). However, the resource-based view and the capabilities 
paradigm have directed researchers’ attention away from micro-level mechanisms. It is our hope that 
the recent cognition research on FDI and the microfoundations approach can ignite the interest in the 
managerial processes underlying MNEs’ global expansion. 
 
6.1 Managerial relevance 
 There are a whole host of grounds for managers to justify the decision to expand to a high-
risk country. Yet, we have argued that the risk averse or risk seeking preferences highlighted by 
researchers may be masking the biases in the decision process that managers themselves are 
unconscious of. Managers need to be aware that they are not unlike other human agents. 
Overconfidence, prospect theory bias, and erroneous generalization of previous experience are well 
documented in academic literature, and as commonly found among managers as they are in general 
population. These biases have incurred costs and losses, at least in early years of expansion in a 
foreign country (Petersen et al., 2008), that could have been avoided. Even if group decision making 
in the boardroom can effectively alleviate calculus flaw in the final decision, the information input to 
that calculus is often collected by frontline managers that carry cultural biases and self-interests 
motivations. Thus we advise managers to evaluate thoroughly the third party information about host 
country environment rather than rely on anecdotes and preconceptions; to specify organization 
routines for information collection rather than await sporadic investment opportunities to come along; 
and to follow a consistent decision model for a given group of strategic choice rather than base 
decisions on feelings and instincts. 
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 At the firm level, research adopting the microfoundations approach is poised to offer practical 
implications. The weak form of microfoundations suggests that firms intervene at the micro level by 
recruiting managers with specific types of experience and traits and thus greater cognitive capability 
(Gary et al., 2012), which can compensate for the lack of firm-level routines regarding risk-taking 
(Maitland and Sammartino, 2015a) and improve firm performance in overseas venturing (Perkins, 
2014). In group decision-making, self-confirming beliefs, competitive blind spots and internal causal 
attributions are as likely to be amplified as they are to be mitigated (Powell et al., 2011). Identifying 
the conditions under which managers are more or less biased, and economic efficiency is more or less 
compromised, is more meaningful than assuming that managers’ idiosyncratic preferences and self-
interests should matter. Organizational structures can also be designed in response to the political 
dynamics among the corporate elites, ensuring that the results of power contention are aligned with 
shareholders’ interests. Both interventions are more tractable than it is to influence the unobserved 
“capabilities” when the underlying mechanisms are assumed rather than tested. 
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Appendix. Summary of empirical research on risk and uncertainty in the FDI context 
Author(s) Level Key variable(s) Definition Measures Data Method Major findings 
1) Acedo and 
Florin (2006) 
Individual Risk perception Not defined Managers’ evaluation of the 
level of risk associated with 
internationalization, adapted 
from Sitkin and Weingart 
(1995) 
Small and medium 
size Spanish firms 
from seven 
industries 
Survey CEOs’ perceptions of risk 
mediate the effect of firm age, 
size and scope of national 
operations and the effect of 
individual international posture 
on the degree of 
internationalization. 
2) Acedo and 
Jones (2007) 
Individual Risk perception Not defined Managers’ evaluation of the 
level of risk associated with 
internationalization, adapted 
from Sitkin and Weingart 
(1995) 
216 top managers of 
small and medium 
sized enterprises 
(SMEs) 
Survey Managers’ risk perception is 
negatively associated with speed 
of internationalization. 
3) Agarwal and 
Ramaswami 
(1992) 
Firm Investment risk; 
Contractual risk 
Uncertainty over the 
continuation of environmental 
factors which are critical to the 
survival and profitability of a 
firm’s operations in that 
country; 
Difficulties of writing and 
enforcing contracts that specify 
every eventuality due to 
external uncertainty 
Managers’ perceptions about 
environmental stability and 
host government’s policies 
toward profit repatriation and 
asset expropriation; 
Perceptions about costs of 
making and enforcing 
contracts, risk of knowledge 
dissipation and risk of quality 
deterioration 
97 US equipment 
leasing firms 
Survey Investment risk reduces the 
likelihood of investment while 
contractual risk increases the 
likelihood of choosing investment 
mode over exporting.  
4) Agarwal 
(1994) 
Firm Country risk The volatility of a host 
country's political and market 
conditions 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
148 foreign 
investment of US 
manufacturing firms 
over the period 
1985-1989 
Secondary Country risk does not moderate 
the relationship between socio-
cultural distance and choice of 
joint venture. 
5) Ahmed et al. 
(2002) 
Firm Risk perception The predictive accuracy on a 
changing event that might lead 
to negative organizational 
outcomes 
Managers’ perceptions of the 
differences between home and 
host country, and the level of 
predictability of a range of 
environmental dimensions 
69 Malaysian public 
firms 
Survey Low risk perception leads to high 
ownership entry mode. 
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Author(s) Level Key variable(s) Definition Measures Data Method Major findings 
6) Alcantara and 
Mitsuhashi 
(2012) 
Firm Market 
opportunity 
risk; 
Political risk 
Unpredictability of business 
prospects and institutional 
conditions that may affect 
business operations in the host 
country 
Number of home country 
buyers or rivals; 
Political Constraints Index 
(POLCON) 
FDI entries of 
Japanese auto parts 
manufacturers over 
the period 1978-
2000 
Secondary Intense competition in home 
country induces MNEs to invest 
in foreign countries with high 
market opportunity risk and high 
political risk. 
7) Amariuta et al. 
(1979) 
Individual Risk perception Not defined Three-item scale capturing 
perception of expropriation 
risk, attitude toward 
communist regime and 
perception of political risk 
120 executives (VP-
international) from 
120 US firms 
Survey Increased knowledge about East 
Europe lowers managers’ 
perception of political risk and 
raises perceived inconvenience of 
dealing with those countries. 
8) Asiedu (2002) Country Political risk Not defined Average number of 
assassinations and revolutions 
FDI into 71 African 
countries from 1988 
to 1997 
Secondary Political risk is not significant to 
FDI. 
9) Bekaert et al. 
(2014) 
Country Political risk The risk that the government’s 
actions or imperfections of the 
host country’s institutions 
adversely affect the value of an 
investment in that country 
Political risk spread based on 
ICRG 
FDI inflows to 30+ 
countries from 1994 
to 2009 
Secondary FDI is negatively related to 
political risk, and is much more 
sensitive to political risk than to 
economic outlook.  
10) Brouthers 
(1995) 
Firm Risk perception Not explicitly defined but with 
reference to Miller’s (1992) 
framework 
Managers’ perceptions about 
control risk including cultural 
difference and managerial 
experience, and market 
complexity risk including 
political risk and competitive 
rivalry, all adapted from 
Miller (1992) 
125 US MNEs from 
computer software 
industry 
Survey Greater control risk and market 
complexity lead to greater 
likelihood of independent entry 
mode like licensing. 
11) Brouthers et 
al. (2000) 
Firm Perceived 
environmental 
uncertainty 
Not defined Perceived Environmental 
Uncertainty 2 (PEU2) by 
Werner et al. (1996), a 
perceptual measure on the 
unpredictability of 28 
environmental factors 
95 of 500 largest 
firms based in 
European Union 
nations 
Survey Satisfaction with performance is 
increased when firms take into 
account environmental 
uncertainty in entry mode choice. 
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Author(s) Level Key variable(s) Definition Measures Data Method Major findings 
12) Brouthers and 
Brouthers 
(2001) 
Firm Investment risk Not defined Investment risk measure by 
Agarwal and Ramaswami 
(1992) 
231 Dutch, German, 
British and US 
firms doing 
business in 5 
Central and Eastern 
European countries 
Survey The relationship between cultural 
distance and entry mode is 
contingent on the level of 
investment risk in the host 
country. 
13) Brouthers 
(2002) 
Firm Investment risk Note defined Perceptual question: (1) the 
risk of converting and 
repatriating profits, (2) 
nationalization risks, (3) 
cultural similarity, and (4) the 
stability of the political, social 
and economic conditions in 
the target market 
178 entries of large 
European firms in 
27 countries 
Survey Investment risk influences mode 
choice, which in turn affects 
financial and non-financial 
performance. 
14) Brouthers et 
al. (2002) 
Firm International 
risk perception 
Not defined Perceived Environmental 
Uncertainty 2 (PEU2) 
95 of 500 largest 
firms based in 
European Union 
nations 
Survey Service and manufacturing firms 
respond similarly to some 
dimensions of international risk 
but differ with the others 
regarding entry mode choices.  
15) Brouthers and 
Brouthers 
(2003) 
Firm Environmental 
uncertainty; 
Behavioral 
uncertainty; 
Risk propensity 
Environmental threat to the 
stability of business operation; 
Inability of the parent firm to 
monitor and control the 
performance of foreign 
subsidiary; 
Managers’ tendency to take risk 
that varies with national culture 
Investment risk by Agarwal 
and Ramaswami (1992); 
Contractual risk by Agarwal 
and Ramaswami (1992); 
Hofstede’s (1980) uncertainty 
avoidance 
227 European firms 
that have operations 
in Central and East 
European countries 
Survey High environmental uncertainty 
induces service firms to choose 
wholly owned entry mode while 
high behavioral uncertainty 
induces them to choose joint 
venture. For manufacturing firms, 
the effects are opposite. 
Manufacturing firms from home 
countries with low risk propensity 
cultures prefer joint venture 
modes. 
16) Brouthers et 
al. (2008) 
Firm Country risk Not defined, but is regarded as 
one component of the formal 
institutional environment with 
particular regard to 
governmental or political 
actions 
Euromoney Country Risk 232 Dutch, Greek, 
German, and U.S. 
firms that have 
operations in the 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
Survey Country risk distance moderates 
the relationship between firm-
specific resources and entry mode 
choice as well as dynamic 
learning capabilities and entry 
mode choice. 
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Author(s) Level Key variable(s) Definition Measures Data Method Major findings 
17) Buckley, 
Clegg, et al. 
(2007) 
Country Political risk Not defined ICRG Approved Chinese 
FDI to 49 countries 
from 1984 to 2001 
Secondary Chinese outward FDI prefer less 
developed and risky host 
countries between 1982 and 1991. 
18) Coeurderoy 
and Murray 
(2008) 
Firm Political risk Not defined “Political risk” from 
Institutional Investor 
First five foreign 
market entries of 
each of the 241new-
technology-based 
firms in the UK and 
134 in Germany 
Survey Political risk is highly significant 
for both entry choice and the 
ranking of entry preferences. 
Large firms are more cautious of 
political risk.  
19) Cui and Jiang 
(2009) 
Firm Country risk The perceived discontinuity or 
unpredictability of the political 
and economic environment of a 
host country 
Six-item scale questions 
adapted from Brouthers 
(2002), Agarwal (1994) and 
Bell (1996) 
FDI entries of 138 
Chinese firms from 
across 8 provincial 
areas 
Survey Country risk does not have 
significant impact on FDI entry 
mode choice of Chinese firms. 
20) Cuypers and 
Martin (2009) 
Firm Exogenous 
uncertainty; 
Endogenous 
uncertainty 
Uncertainty of which the 
resolution is unaffected by the 
actions of the firm; 
Uncertainty that is resolved (at 
least in part) by the actions of 
the firm itself over time 
Economic uncertainty 
(Euromoney Country Risk), 
institutional uncertainty 
(Special Economic Zones or 
Coastal regions), exchange 
rate uncertainty (parallel 
market premium); 
Cultural uncertainty (Kogut 
and Singh), uncertainty about 
development capabilities 
(involvement of development 
activities), scope-related 
uncertainty (the number of 
activities performed) 
6472 Sino-foreign 
joint ventures (JVs) 
Secondary Conventional real options logic is 
applicable when uncertainty is 
resolved exogenously, but not 
when it is resolved endogenously. 
21) Datta et al. 
(2015) 
Firm Downside risk; 
Political risk 
Not defined; 
The likelihood of political and 
social events in a country 
inﬂuencing the business climate 
in a way that negatively impacts 
investors 
Greenfield investment, as 
compared to acquisition; 
ICRG 
291 cross-border 
acquisitions and 105 
greenﬁeld start-ups 
by non-diversiﬁed 
US manufacturing 
ﬁrms 
Secondary Managerial equity ownership and 
the proportion of contingent pay 
in key managers’ compensation 
structures increase the likelihood 
of cross-border acquisitions over 
greenﬁeld investments. Host 
country political risk positively 
moderates this relationship. 
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Author(s) Level Key variable(s) Definition Measures Data Method Major findings 
22) De Beule et 
al. (2014) 
Firm Endogenous 
uncertainty; 
Exogenous 
uncertainty 
Related to the investment itself 
and can often be found as 
relationship-specific uncertainty 
when firms are sourcing 
intangibles externally for new 
business development; 
Take the form of either 
environmental turbulence or 
technological newness 
Proxied by investments by 
EMNEs, as compared to those 
by advanced country MNEs 
(AMNEs); 
Proxied by investments in 
high-tech industries, and by 
institutional distance 
451 acquisitions by 
foreign firms in 
Italy between 2001 
and 2010 in 78 
manufacturing 
industries 
Secondary EMNEs acquire significantly less 
ownership than AMNEs, 
especially in high-tech industries. 
Institutional distance in trade and 
investment freedom increases the 
probability to undertake full 
acquisition for EMNEs as 
opposed to AMNEs. 
23) Delios and 
Beamish 
(1999) 
Firm Country risk Extent of political and 
economic risk 
Euromoney Country Risk 1424 greenfield 
subsidiaries of 
Japanese 
manufacturing firms 
Secondary Weak evidence on the negative 
relationship between host country 
political and economic risk and 
ownership levels 
24) Delios and 
Henisz (2000) 
Firm Public 
expropriation 
hazard; 
Private 
expropriation 
hazard 
Threats to firms’ revenue 
streams posed by the monopoly 
of the state on coercion; 
Opportunistic behavior of 
partners due to incomplete 
contract 
Political Constraints  
(POLCON), and equity 
restrictions surveyed by 
World Competitiveness 
Report; 
R&D/advertising-to-sales 
2827 greenfield FDI 
by 660 Japanese 
firms in 18 
emerging 
economies 
Secondary Host country experience (industry 
experience) mitigates the effect of 
public (private) expropriation 
hazard, leading to higher (lower) 
equity ownership.  
25) Delios and 
Henisz 
(2003a) 
Firm Policy 
uncertainty 
Both the probability of a policy 
change and the likelihood that 
any change is likely to be 
adverse 
POLCON (policy change), 
and the size of the host 
country’s manufacturing 
sector as a percentage of GDP 
(competitors’ lobbying effort) 
6465 FDI of 665 
Japanese 
manufacturing firms 
in 49 countries from 
1980 to 1998 
Secondary As uncertainty in the policy 
environment increases, initial 
entry by distribution is replaced 
by an initial entry by a joint 
venture manufacturing plant. 
26) Delios and 
Henisz 
(2003b) 
Firm Political hazard Uncertainty in the host policy 
environment due to weak 
institutional constraints on 
policy makers 
POLCON 3857 entries by 665 
Japanese 
manufacturing firms 
from 1980 to 1998 
Secondary Experience with political hazard 
countries help firms to expand to 
high hazard countries whilst 
market- and cultural-based 
experience helps them enter low 
hazard countries. 
27) Demirbag et 
al. (2007) 
Firm Political risk; 
Risk perception 
Not defined; 
Not defined 
POLCON; 
Linguistic distance 
6838 foreign equity 
ventures in Turkey 
as of 2003 
Secondary Both political constraint and 
linguistic distance induce MNEs 
to opt for majority owned JVs.  
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28) Demirbag et 
al. (2010) 
Individual Politically based 
uncertainty 
Not defined Perceptual measures based on 
PEU but extended to other 
institutional elements 
Turkish firms 
investing in the 
transitional 
economies of the 
Central Asian 
Republics. 
Survey Perceived ethical-societal 
uncertainties is positively 
associated with the choice of joint 
venture over wholly owned 
subsidiary. Perceived risk of 
intervention increases the 
likelihood of joint venture. 
29) Duanmu 
(2012) 
Firm Political risk; 
Economic risk 
Not defined; 
Not defined 
ICRG 264 entries by 189 
Chinese MNEs 
investing in 
47countries from 
1999 to 2008 
Secondary State owned enterprises (SOEs) 
respond to political risk less 
negatively than non-SOEs. 
Economic risk is insignificant to 
both SOEs and non-SOEs. 
30) Duanmu 
(2014) 
Firm Expropriation 
risk 
The deficiencies of a country’s 
protection of private property 
rights, especially their 
protection against government 
expropriation 
Property right protection 
index constructed by the 
Heritage Foundation 
894 greenfield 
investment by 
Chinese firms from 
2003 to 2010 
Secondary Political relations between home 
and host state mitigates the 
negative impact of expropriation 
risk on FDI. Both SOEs and 
private firms benefit, but SOEs 
benefit more. Only SOEs benefit 
from host country’s export 
dependence on the home country. 
31) Dunning 
(1981) 
Country Country risk Not defined Business Environment Risk 
Index (expert survey) 
FDI flows from 67 
countries from 
1967-1978 
Secondary Country risk does not affect FDI 
flows. 
32) Erramilli and 
Rao (1993) 
Firm Country risk Volatility in the external 
environment of the host country 
Categorical variable of high 
vs. low risk country 
114 US service 
firms engaged in 
FDI  
Survey Country risk intensifies the 
negative relationship between 
asset specificity and shared 
ownership mode. 
33) Fatehi and 
Safizadeh 
(1994) 
Country Political risk Political-event-induced policy 
changes that could have a 
negative impact on foreign 
firms 
Count of socio-political 
disturbance events 
Annual flow of US 
manufacturing, 
mining, and 
petroleum FDI in 14 
developing 
countries over the 
period 1950-1982 
Secondary The relationship between FDI 
flow and political risk is industry 
specific. 
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34) Feinberg and 
Gupta (2009) 
Firm Country risk A multidimensional construct 
encompassing many types of 
country-specific political and 
economic hazards that share 
common institutional drivers 
The risk of contract 
repudiation in the IRIS 
dataset provided by ICRG 
3739 subsidiaries of 
1279 US-based 
MNEs in 19 
countries, from 
1983 to 1996 
Secondary Under uncertainty, MNEs 
increase the extent of their within-
firm sales. Trade internalization 
as a response to country risk is 
weaker when MNEs have greater 
experience deploying political 
strategies. 
35) Fernández-
Méndez et al. 
(2015) 
Firm Governmental 
discretion 
The degree to which 
governments can unilaterally 
alter the conditions in which 
firms operate in a country, in a 
way that affects investments' 
profitability 
POLCONV FDI location 
choices made from 
1986 to 2008 by 
105 Spanish firms 
listed on the Madrid 
Stock Exchange in 
1990 
Secondary The willingness of regulated 
physical infrastructure firms to 
invest in countries with 
governmental discretion increases 
in countries having both a legal 
system from the same family as 
the one of the home country and 
infrastructure voids. 
36) Figueira-de-
Lemos and 
Hadjikhani 
(2014) 
Firm Risk and 
uncertainty 
Uncertainty consists of two 
types; pure uncertainty is 
associated with the 
unpredictability of the future 
events and contingent 
uncertainty refers to the lack of 
knowledge. Risk is a function 
of commitment and uncertainty. 
Illustrated with graphs 93 interviews with 
25 Swedish and 17 
Iranian managers 
involved in the nine 
Swedish MNEs’ 
foreign operations 
in Iran before, 
during and after the 
1978/79 Islamic 
Revolution 
Case 
study 
An environmental change is 
perceived as low risk induces 
incremental commitment of 
tangible assets, while firms 
decrease tangible assets and 
commit in a more intangible way 
when facing a detrimental change 
of environment. 
37) Filatotchev et 
al. (2007) 
Firm Risk preference Not defined Inferred from the equity stake 
of different shareholders 
285 FDI by 122 
Taiwanese firms in 
China, 1999-2003 
Secondary Risk preferences of family and 
institutional shareholders 
determine equity commitment. 
38) Fisch (2008a) Firm Uncertainty A continuous variable reflecting 
environmental volatility, which 
can be resolved by a wait-and-
see approach. 
The standard deviation of the 
6-month rate of change of the 
Composite Leading Indicator 
within a country and year 
5379 entries in the 
manufacturing 
sector by 2282 
German firms in 
OECD countries 
over 5 years 
Secondary Under the moderating influence 
of competition, the economic 
uncertainty in a host country has a 
U-shaped influence on the 
moment of entry. Uncertainty has 
a negative effect on the amount of 
capital at entry, but no effect on 
the share in capital at entry. 
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39) Fisch (2008b) Firm Exogenous 
uncertainty; 
Endogenous 
uncertainty 
The time-variant volatility of 
the host country environment; 
A disability of the investor to 
control the subsidiary 
The standard deviation of the 
6-month rate of change of the 
Composite Leading Indicator 
within a country and year; 
International experience – the 
number of foreign 
subsidiaries held by the 
investor prior to the focal 
entry 
643 projects in the 
manufacturing 
sector by German 
firms in OECD 
countries 
Secondary The investment rate in new 
foreign subsidiaries depends 
negatively on the economic 
volatility of the host country but 
positively on the firm’s 
international experience. The 
influence of uncertainty declines 
over time after the entry.  
40) Forlani et al. 
(2008) 
Individual Risk perception; 
Risk propensity 
Risk as capital losses; 
Not defined 
Perceived riskiness rating on 
psychometric scales; 
Risk preference measured by 
Schneider and Lopes (1986) 
187 export 
managers across a 
large mid-western 
metropolitan area in 
US 
Field 
experimen
t 
Managers in lower-capability 
firms see the least risk in the non-
ownership entry mode whilst 
those in higher-capability firms 
see the least risk in the equal-
partnership entry mode. 
41) Garcia-Canal 
and Guillén 
(2008) 
Firm Policy risk The likelihood that the 
government might change 
policies in a way that adversely 
affects the interests of the 
foreign investors. 
POLCON Entries of 25 
Spanish listed 
companies in 
regulated industries 
into Latin American 
Secondary Firms from regulated industries 
prefer high policy risk. Firms 
with state equity (increased 
foreign experience) exhibit more 
(less) tolerance for political risk. 
42) Gatignon and 
Anderson 
(1988) 
Firm Country risk Environmental threat to the 
stability of business operation 
Categorical variable featuring 
low, moderate and high risk 
countries  
1267 entries of 
firms among the 
largest MNEs over 
the period 1960-
1975 
Secondary In highly risky countries, firms 
avoid outright ownership of their 
subsidiaries. 
43) George et al. 
(2005) 
Firm Risk propensity Not defined Inferred from scale and scope 
of internationalization 
889 SMEs 
headquartered in 
Sweden 
Survey Increased ownership by SMEs’ 
managers can induce risk 
aversion. The involvement of 
institutional investors in SMEs’ 
strategic decisions reduces 
managers’ risk aversion. 
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44) Goerzen et al. 
(2010) 
Firm Environmental 
risk 
Financial and economic risks 
defined as fluctuations in the 
overall level of economic 
activity and prices in a country; 
Political risk defined as the 
possibility of political change 
and the feasibility of policy 
change by a host country 
government; 
Cultural risk defined as the 
difficulty of predicting the 
actions of others 
Economic, financial and 
political risk measured by 
ICRG, cultural risk measured 
by Kogut and Singh (1988) 
index 
305 Japanese FDI 
announcements 
including 168 JVs 
and 137 wholly 
owned subsidiaries 
(WOS) 
Secondary Firms’ direct and indirect 
experience plays a significant role 
in mitigating the stock market’s 
responses to host country risk.  
45) Globerman 
and Shapiro 
(2003) 
Country Foreign 
exchange risk; 
Political 
instability 
Currency volatility; 
Not defined 
The degree of exchange rate 
volatility against  the US 
dollar over the sample period;  
World Governance Indicators' 
(WGI) Political Instability 
and Violence index 
FDI flows from US 
to 88 countries over 
the period 1995-
1997 
Secondary Political instability does not affect 
FDI flows at all while foreign 
exchange risk is rarely significant.  
46) Heidenreich 
et al. (2015) 
Individual Uncertainty Uncertainty involves both 
downside risks and upside 
potential. 
Factor-market uncertainty, 
political-regulatory 
uncertainty, and socio-
cultural uncertainty 
Secondary data and 
interviews with two 
key decision-makers 
involved in a firm’s 
investment in 
Ghana 
Case 
study 
The possible use of political 
strategies reduces entrepreneurs’ 
perceived uncertainty regarding a 
developing country. Past 
experience in developed countries 
induces entrepreneurs to believe 
that their skills can outweigh the 
external threats.  
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47) Henisz (2000) Firm Political hazard; 
Contractual 
hazard 
The feasibility of policy change 
by the host country government 
which either directly or 
indirectly diminishes MNEs’ 
expected return on assets in the 
host country; 
Comprised of asset specificity, 
hazard of technological leakage 
and hazard of free riding on 
reputation and brand name 
POLCON (formal), and 
unexpected corruption level 
measured corruption level in 
International Country Risk 
Guide minus POLCON 
(informal); 
Ratio of property, plant and 
equipment/R&D 
expense/advertising expense 
to total sales  
3389 foreign 
manufacturing 
operations 
established by 461 
US firms in 112 
countries 
Secondary The effect of political hazard on 
the probability of choosing a 
majority owned entry mode is 
contingent on contractual hazard. 
48) Henisz and 
Delios (2001) 
Firm Firm specific 
uncertainty; 
Policy 
uncertainty 
Not defined, but referring to the 
uncertainty derived from an 
organization's unfamiliarity 
with market characteristics,  
and the uncertainty derived 
from characteristics of the 
policymaking apparatus of a 
market that make the 
characteristics of the market 
unstable or difficult to forecast 
Log of the sum of subsidiary 
years of manufacturing 
experience in a prospective 
host country; 
POLCON 
2,705 overseas 
investments made 
by 658 Japanese 
listed firms in new 
manufacturing 
plants in 52 
countries during the 
1990-96 
Secondary Imitating the behavior of several 
reference groups of firms helps 
reduce the firm-specific 
uncertainty, but cannot mitigate 
the negative impact of policy 
uncertainty associated with a host 
country. 
49) Henisz and 
Delios (2004) 
Firm Political hazard; 
Regime change 
The likelihood of change in the 
status-quo policies that affect 
firms’ costs, revenues and asset 
values; 
Unpredictability of the 
environment arising from the 
changes in political institutions 
to an entirely new structure 
POLCON; 
Polity index 
2,283 foreign 
subsidiaries, formed 
during 1991–2000 
by 642 Japanese 
manufacturing firms 
in 52 countries 
Secondary Under a stable political regime, 
peer exits increase the probability 
of exit and firm experience reduce 
it. Under a changing regime, peer 
exists continue to provide 
informational signals regarding 
the environment but the 
experience-based influence with 
the old regime proves a liability. 
50) Herrmann 
and Datta 
(2002) 
Firm Risk exposure Not explicitly defined, but 
associated with the extent of 
resource commitment and 
switching cost 
Proxied by full-control vs. 
shared-control entry mode 
271 foreign entries 
by US listed 
manufacturing firms 
Secondary Successor CEOs’ increasing 
tenure and international 
experience encourages full-
control (riskier) entry mode. 
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51) Holburn and 
Zelner (2010) 
Firm Policy risk The risk that a government will 
opportunistically alter policies 
to expropriate an investing 
firm’s profits or assets 
POLCON FDI of global 
private electricity-
industry firms 
during the period 
1990–1999 
Secondary Firms from home countries with 
weak institutional constraints or 
strong redistributive pressures are 
less sensitive to host-country 
policy risk 
52) Hsieh et al. 
(2010) 
Individual Risk perception 1) the perception that the JV 
performance could decline in 
the foreseeable future; 2) the 
perception that the relationship 
between a foreign partner and 
its local partner could 
deteriorate in the foreseeable 
future; 3) the perception that a 
partner could be unreliable or 
unwilling to commit itself to the 
collaborative venture; and 4) 
the perception that a partner 
could not be trusted 
Perceptual measures 
developed for this study 
71 foreign 
expatriates of IJVs 
established in 
Taiwan from 1983-
2003 
Survey Partners’ perception of risk 
mediates the effect of JV 
situational conditions on post-
formation control. 
53) Jiménez 
(2010) 
Firm Political risk Not defined Economic Freedom Index by 
Heritage Foundation, 
Corruption Perceptions Index 
by Transparency 
International, and POLCON 
166 Spanish MNEs 
in 119 countries at 
the year 2005 
Secondary MNEs with a broader 
international expansion tend to 
invest in more politically risky 
places. A higher level of diversity 
in the host countries’ political risk 
is associated with a greater scope 
of internationalization. 
54) Jiménez et al. 
(2014) 
Firm Political risk The probability of a 
government using its monopoly 
over legal coercion to refrain 
from fulfilling existing 
agreements with an MNE, in 
order to affect the redistribution 
of rents between the public and 
private sector. 
Average and variance scores 
of Corruption Perceptions 
Index by Transparency 
International and POLCON 
for the investment location 
portfolio of each MNE 
164 Spanish MNEs 
with investments in 
119 countries 
Secondary Exposure to political risk 
increases a firm’s scope of 
internationalization. The 
relationship is stronger in those 
companies belonging to industries 
subjected to higher levels of 
regulation by the authorities. 
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55) Jiménez et al. 
(2015) 
Firm Political risk Not defined POLCONV 119 Spanish firms 
with more than 250 
employees and 
more than one 
product line 
Secondary MNEs that have experience in 
high political risk environments 
are more likely to tolerate risk 
and find a suitable environment to 
achieve economies of scope. 
56) Jiménez and 
Delgado-
García (2012) 
Firm Political risk Not defined Corruptions Perception Index, 
POLCONV, and Economic 
Freedom by the Heritage 
Foundation 
164 Spanish MNEs 
with investments in 
119 countries 
Secondary The level of political risk 
assumed by the MNEs has a 
positive influence on their 
performance and vice versa. 
57) Kim and 
Hwang 
(1992) 
Firm Country risk Not defined Managers’ perceptions about 
the instability of host political 
system and the likelihood of 
adverse policies 
96 US manufacturer 
that have recently 
engaged in 
international 
expansion 
Survey High country risk leads to low 
commitment entry mode. 
58) Kim et al. 
(1993) 
Firm Corporate risk Not defined Standard deviation of firm’s 
return on assets 
125 large US MNEs 
over a 5-year period 
Secondary A new risk-adjusted return 
measure suggests that high return-
low risk profile can be achieved 
through international 
diversification. 
59) Kiss et al. 
(2013) 
Individual Internationalisat
ion risk bias 
The difference between 
objective risk and subjective 
risk perception 
Compare OECD country risk 
measures with managers’ rate 
on the riskiness of host 
countries 
CEOs of 286 firms 
that 
internationalized 
early 
Survey Internationalization risk bias 
mediates the relationship between 
internationalization motivation 
and post-entry scope. 
60) Kobrin 
(1976) 
Country Political risk Discontinuities in the political 
environment that potentially 
affect the profit or other goals 
of a particular firm 
A composite measure based 
on political event data, 
including political rebellion, 
government instability and 
planned subversion 
The number of new 
manufacturing 
subsidiaries 
established by 187 
large US 
manufacturer in 61 
countries over the 
period 1966-1967 
Secondary Political risk does not affect FDI 
flows.  
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61) Kwok and 
Reeb (2000) 
Firm Corporate risk Not defined Total risk, measured as the 
standard deviation of monthly 
returns using 60 months of 
return data 
1921 public firm 
from 32 countries in 
which 1007 are 
MNEs, over the 
period 1992-1996 
Secondary Emerging country firms see a 
decrease in total and systematic 
risks as they increase the degree 
of internationalization. The effect 
is opposite for developed country 
firms.  
62) Levis (1979) Country Political 
instability 
Not defined Political competition index 
regarding the legitimacy of 
political system 
FDI flows from 25 
developing 
countries over the 
period 1965-1967 
Secondary Political instability deters FDI, 
but of secondary importance to 
economic factors. 
63) Li and Yao 
(2010) 
Firm Policy 
uncertainty 
Political institutions that allow 
policy-makers to change the 
policy regime capriciously 
Provincial level index 
consisting of five factors: 
lagged unemployment rate; 
employment in SOEs as a 
percentage of provincial 
population; total provincial 
government budgetary 
expenses as a percentage of 
GDP; provincial government 
employment as a percentage 
of provincial population; and 
FDI policy incentives (the 
existence of special economic 
zones (SEZs) and coastal 
open cities in the province) 
All foreign-invested 
manufacturing 
ventures established 
in China over 1979–
95 by firms from 
other emerging 
economies 
Secondary EMNEs are more likely to be 
influenced by prior entries from 
their home country than by firms 
from other countries Prior 
investments by developed 
economy firms deter new entries 
by emerging economy 
multinationals. Policy uncertainty 
leads to a stronger effect of 
mimicry. 
64) Liang et al. 
(2012) 
Firm Risk-taking 
tendency 
Not defined Inferred from the act of 
internationalization and entry 
mode 
553 Chinese private 
firms in eight major 
cities spreading 
across Pearl River 
delta and Yangtze 
River delta region 
Survey The likelihood of private firms 
choosing a high-risk entry mode 
is determined by organizing 
capability advantages over SOEs, 
and disadvantages compared to 
foreign firms. 
65) López-Duarte 
and Vidal-
Suárez (2010) 
Firm External 
uncertainty 
Uncertainty perceived by the 
investing company in the 
formal and informal 
institutional environment 
Political risk measured by 
Euromoney Risk Index; 
Cultural distance measured by 
Kogut and Singh Index 
334 FDI by 63 
listed Spanish firms 
in 34 countries 
between 1989 and 
2003 
Secondary An interaction effect between two 
dimensions of external 
uncertainty on entry mode choice 
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66) Loree and 
Guisinger 
(1995) 
Country Political 
instability 
Not defined ICRG Survey data on 
foreign subsidiaries 
of US firms in 48 
countries in 1977 
and 1982 
Secondary Political risk has a negative 
impact on equity FDI in 1982 but 
not in 1977. 
67) Lu et al. 
(2014) 
Firm Investment risk Not defined WGI’s Regulatory Quality 
index 
702 FDI entries of 
Chinese listed firms 
over the period 
2002-2009 
Secondary Favorable host country 
institutions can offset the need for 
prior international experience in 
EE firms’ FDI activities. 
68) Luo (2001) Firm Environmental 
hazard 
Not defined Government intervention, 
environmental uncertainty 
and property right protection 
measured on scales 
174 foreign 
subsidiaries in 
China across 
Yangtze River Delta 
and Pearl River 
Delta cities 
Survey Joint venture is preferred when 
perceived governmental 
intervention or environmental 
uncertainty is high and wholly-
owned entry mode is preferred 
when intellectual property rights 
are not well protected. 
69) Maitland and 
Sammartino 
(2015a) 
Individual Political hazard The broad spectrum of possible 
actions and outcomes flowing 
from the sovereign state’s 
monopoly control of formal rule 
setting and enforcement, when 
the status quo is maintained or 
changes to the status quo occur 
POLCON and the authors’ 
typology of political hazard 
Interviews and 
surveys with an 
MNE’s 11 senior 
executives and 
board directors, 
triangulated with 
corporate materials 
Interview, 
survey 
and 
secondary 
Individual managers bring 
different cognitive resources to 
the firm decision process of 
entering a politically hazardous 
country. The difference is a 
function of managers’ experience 
breadth and diversity. 
70) Meschi and 
Riccio (2008) 
Firm Country risk Not defined Scores of economic risk and 
political risk provided by 
Political Risk Services 
222 international 
joint ventures in 
Brazil, 1973-2006 
Secondary Survival of international joint 
ventures is not affected by 
country risk. 
71) Michel and 
Shaked 
(1986) 
Firm Firm risk Not defined Total risk and systematic risk 
measured by Sharpe and 
Treynor measure (beta) 
58 large US MNEs 
and 43 domestic 
firms among 
Fortune 500 
Secondary Domestic firms have higher total 
and systematic risk than MNEs. 
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72) Oetzel and 
Oh (2014) 
Firm Discontinuous 
risk 
The possibility that a disaster, 
which is episodic and often 
difficult to anticipate or predict, 
might occur and may have a 
substantial impact on a firm and 
its operating environment 
The number of incidents, 
number of people killed, and 
duration of terrorist attacks, 
natural disasters and 
technological disasters 
respectively 
106 large European 
MNCs and their 
subsidiaries 
operating across 
109 countries 
during 2001-2007 
Secondary Experience with high-impact 
disasters encourages expansion 
within but not entry into other 
countries suffering the same 
disaster. 
73) Oh and 
Oetzel (2011) 
Firm Disaster risk; 
Political risk 
Terrorist attacks, natural 
disasters, and technological 
disasters; 
Political instability 
Number of people killed by 
each disaster risk; 
WGI’s Political Instability 
and Violence index 
71 European 
Fortune Global 500 
firms and their 
subsidiaries from 
2001 to 2006 
Secondary Post-entry disaster risk increases 
subsidiary-level disinvestment. 
Political stability mitigates the 
impact of disaster risk.   
74) Pak and Park 
(2004) 
Firm Political risk One of internalization costs in 
the form of discrimination 
against foreign firms and 
expropriation 
Stability of political situation 
measured by World 
Competitiveness Report 
3,236 foreign 
subsidiaries of 444 
Japanese 
manufacturing firms 
as of 1999 
Secondary Political risk leads to low 
ownership mode. 
75) Puck et al. 
(2013) 
Firm Risk exposure Caused by the comparatively 
under-developed institutional 
frameworks and more rapid 
changes in the investment 
climate 
Self-reported perceptual 
measure of a subsidiary’s 
exposure to legal, political, 
and economic risks 
173 subsidiaries in 
Brazil, China, India, 
Russia, South 
Africa and Turkey 
Survey Whether political strategies can 
reduce firms’ risk exposure 
depends on a) if they sell to 
businesses or end consumers and 
b) the specific strategies being 
employed. 
76) Quer et al. 
(2012) 
Firm Political risk Institutional constraints related 
to political and legal regime that 
may negatively affect economic 
activity 
ICRG 139 investments 
made by 29 Fortune 
500 Chinese firms 
in 52 countries 
between 2002 and 
2009 
Secondary Political risk is not related to FDI 
location choice.  
77) Ramasamy et 
al. (2012) 
Firm Political risk Not defined WGI’s Political Instability 
and Violence Index 
FDI projects of 63 
large Chinese listed 
firms over the 
period 2006-2008 
Secondary SOEs are attracted to politically 
risky countries, whilst the effect 
is not significant for private firms. 
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78) Ramos and 
Ashby (2013) 
Firm Organized 
crime risk 
Provide only definition of 
organized crime 
Denounced homicides per 
capita; Country crime score 
by Global Competitiveness 
Report 
FDI of 9 industries 
from 103 countries 
into the 32 Mexican 
states from 2001 to 
2010 
Secondary Home country experience with 
organized crime increases MNEs’ 
investment in host countries with 
high level of organized crime. 
79) Reeb et al. 
(1998) 
Firm Systematic risk Earning volatility Portfolio beta instead of 
individual security beta 
880 or 844 MNEs 
over the period 
1987-1996, 
depending on 
different dependent 
variables  
Secondary Internationalization may incur 
additional risk like exchange risk, 
political risk and information 
asymmetry that offset the benefit 
of diversification, leading to a 
positive relationship between 
internationalization and 
systematic risk. 
80) Reuer and 
Leiblein 
(2000) 
Firm Downside risk A probability-weighted function 
of below target performance 
outcomes 
Lower partial moments based 
on ROA, ROE and CAPM 
beta 
357 US 
manufacturing firms 
over the period 
1985-1994 
Secondary Corporate multinationality is not 
significantly related to downside 
risk, and firms that are more 
active in engaging in IJVs obtain 
higher levels of downside risk. 
81) Richards and 
Yang (2007) 
Firm Environmental 
uncertainty; 
Behavioral 
uncertainty 
Caused by unexpected 
occurrences in the political, 
economic, and social 
environment; 
Arises from partner 
opportunism 
ICRG; 
Whether the JV also engaged 
in marketing activities, and 
the frequency of prior joint 
venture collaboration with the 
same partner 
543 international 
R&D joint ventures 
by foreign firms in 
China, India, Japan, 
and the United 
States over 1985 to 
2004 
Secondary The influence of environmental 
uncertainty (country risk) on 
MNEs’ equity ownership in R&D 
IJVs is insignificant. MNEs 
require a higher equity ownership 
for R&D JVs that also engage in 
marketing. 
82) Rugman 
(1976) 
Firm Corporate risk Not defined Risk as variance in return Large US firms 
among Fortune 500 
over the period 
1960-1969 
Secondary A risk reduction advantage of 
MNEs over domestic firms 
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Author(s) Level Key variable(s) Definition Measures Data Method Major findings 
83) Lee and Song 
(2012) 
Firm Macroeconomic 
uncertainty 
Not defined Depreciation of currency of 
each host country 
Foreign subsidiaries 
of publicly listed 
Korean 
manufacturing firms 
in 61 countries from 
1990 to 2007 
Secondary The increase of a subsidiary’s 
production at the time of its host 
country currency depreciation 
decreases the production of other 
subsidiaries within the same 
MNC network. 
84) Schneider and 
Frey (1985) 
Country Political 
instability 
Internal political troubles that 
disrupt economic process and 
pose threats to MNEs like 
nationalization 
Number of political strikes 
and of riots 
FDI flows from 54 
developing 
countries for the 
year 1976, 1979 and 
1980 
Secondary Political instability negatively 
affects FDI flows. 
85) Schwens et 
al. (2011) 
Firm Formal 
institutional risk 
The constraints resulting from 
insufficiently developed market 
support institutions in the host 
country 
Hermes Country Risk Rating, 
dividing countries into 7 
categories based on 
economic, political, and legal 
situation in the host country 
227 internationally 
active German 
SMEs 
Survey Formal institutional risk 
moderates the relationships 
between international experience, 
proprietary know-how, strategic 
importance, and equity based 
entry modes. 
86) Sethi et al. 
(2003) 
Country Political and 
economic 
stability 
Not defined ICRG FDI flows from US 
to 17 West 
European and 11 
Asian countries 
from 1981 to 2000 
Secondary Very weak effect of political and 
economic stability on FDI flows 
87) Shan (1991) Firm Contextual risk; 
Transactional 
risk 
Risks out of firm’s control; 
Risk can be reduced or 
eliminated through 
internalization of markets or 
integration 
Proxied by location, amount 
of investment, investment 
duration and business scope 
141 Sino-American 
joint ventures 
formed between 
1980 and 1987 in 
China  
Secondary Publicly listed firms are less risk 
averse than non-listed firms.  
88) Shrader et al. 
(2000) 
Firm International 
risk 
With reference to Miller’s 
(1992) framework 
Inferred from country risk, 
entry mode commitment and 
foreign sales ratio, country 
risk measured by Euromoney, 
Institutional Investor and 
Wall Street Journal ratings 
212 entries of 87 
US firms that had 
both made an IPO 
and entered foreign 
markets within first 
six years of birth 
Secondary Firms tradeoff among foreign 
revenue exposure, country risk, 
and entry mode commitment in 
each country to keep the risk 
profile manageable. 
70 
 
Author(s) Level Key variable(s) Definition Measures Data Method Major findings 
89) Slangen and 
van Tulder 
(2009) 
Firm External 
uncertainty 
Not defined Aggregate WGI index 231 entries by 150 
Dutch MNEs into 
48 countries 
Survey Both cultural distance and 
political risk are suboptimal 
proxy for external uncertainty. 
90) Slangen and 
Beugelsdijk 
(2010) 
Firm Institutional 
hazard 
Not defined, but decomposed 
into two types, exogenous and 
endogenous hazard, depending 
on whether it can be resolved 
once realized 
Aggregate WGI index 
(exogenous), cultural distance 
measured by a Euclidean 
distance version of the Kogut 
and Singh (1988) Index 
(endogenous) 
Sales by US foreign 
affiliates to 
affiliated and local 
unaffiliated 
customers in 46 
countries over the 
period 1996-2004 
Secondary The impact of institutional 
hazards on the amount of foreign 
MNE activity is contingent upon 
the type of foreign activity 
(horizontal or vertical) and the 
type of institutional hazard 
(governance or cultural). 
91) Slangen 
(2013) 
Firm Policy 
uncertainty 
Sudden policy change 
stemming from political 
constraints shortages 
POLCON 172 wholly owned 
greenfields and full 
acquisitions by 122 
Dutch MNEs in 33 
foreign countries 
from 1995 to 2003 
Survey Policy uncertainty increases the 
likelihood of wholly owned 
greenfield over full acquisition. 
Planned subsidiary autonomy, 
expected industry performance, 
and religious distance moderate 
this relationship. 
92) Strange et al. 
(2009) 
Firm Risk preference Not defined Inferred from equity stake in 
foreign affiliates, along with 
cultural and historic links 
with the home country 
285 FDI projects by 
Taiwanese listed 
firms in China 
between 1999-2003 
Secondary Firms balance out resource 
commitment and locational risk. 
Different shareholders have 
different risk preferences that 
influence location choice. 
93) Tseng and 
Lee (2010) 
Firm Environmental 
uncertainty 
Not defined Managers’ perceptions about 
unpredictability of market 
environment and institutional 
environment 
84 Taiwanese 
manufacturing firms 
that have foreign 
operations 
Survey In the presence of high turbulent 
market and institutional 
uncertainty, firms with stronger 
market linking capability are 
more likely to choose WOS over 
JV. 
 
